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INTRODUCTION
No problem has ever been solved by ignoring it. So why is
it that regulators have largely turned their backs to issues of
cumulative exposure from chemicals and pesticides? Why is it
that more than 85,000 chemicals are approved for distribution
1
in the United States and yet there are no routine assessments
of public health risks from the combined exposure to multiple
chemicals over multiple pathways? It is certainly not because
policymakers or scientists fail to understand the importance of
cumulative risk to issues of public health. The risk science literature routinely and openly acknowledges that cumulative
risk assessments are the tool for tackling real-world problems
2
of exposure. Individuals, after all, do not live in a bubble. And
chemical exposure is not neatly and independently divided between fire retardants in couches, BPA in plastics, and endocrine disruptors in soaps. No. Life is messy and full of com3
pounding consequences.
1. About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECAGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/about-tsca-chemical
-substance-inventory (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“The Inventory was initially
published in 1979, and a second version, containing about 62,000 chemical
substances, was published in 1982. The TSCA Inventory has continued to
grow since then, and now lists about 85,000 chemicals.”).
2. See, e.g., Sarah S. Gallagher et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment Lessons Learned: A Review of Case Studies and Issue Papers, 120 CHEMOSPHERE
697, 698 (2015); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the risk science literature).
3. Major environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act have some regulatory provisions aimed at understanding cumulative impacts of their targeted regulatory
programs. For example, the Clean Air Act sets national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants and requires states to adopt implementation plans that ensure the aggregate air emissions in that state will
not exceed the ambient standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2012). Similarly,
the Clean Water Act requires states to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) for all water bodies that fail to meet ambient water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012). These TMDLs provide a means of addressing
water quality problems that arise from multiple point sources, unregulated
nonpoint sources, and background levels of pollution that collectively impair a
water body despite the issuance of individual discharge permits. For an indepth discussion of TMDLs, see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d. ed. 2002). Finally,
the National Environmental Policy Act requires all federal agencies to consider cumulative impacts of their proposed actions by accounting for the combined impacts of past, present, and future projects on a particular resource.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2016) (defining “cumulative impact” in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations that implement NEPA). While these
provisions aimed at ameliorating aggregate harm have met only moderate
success, the point is that Congress at least recognized that addressing indiTION
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Despite evolutions in scientific thinking, the implementation of the two major federal environmental laws most directly
impacting the entry of chemicals and pesticide to the market4
place—the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Fed5
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) —
have largely ignored issues of cumulative risk. With some limited exceptions, chemicals and pesticides are regulated on a
chemical-by-chemical basis instead of based on real-world exposures. And though legal scholars have long agreed that chem6
ical regulation was broken under TSCA, cumulative impacts—
the heart of public health concerns—had been virtually absent
7
from proposals to reform TSCA.
This is not to say that both the old and new legal frameworks are incapable of addressing cumulative risk or that Congress did not appreciate the need to do so. In fact, Congress
recognized that cumulative exposures to chemicals lie at the
heart of public health risks when it enacted TSCA forty years
8
ago. And in the separate realm of pesticide legislation, Congress amended FIFRA twenty years ago to address aggregate

vidual dischargers or emitters would not necessarily ensure that the aggregate
levels of pollution were sufficient to protect public health.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012).
6. For a sampling of the critiques leveled against the TSCA, see Tracy
Bach, Better Living Through Chemicals (Regulation)? The Chemical Safety
Improvement Act of 2013 Through an Environmental Public Health Law Lens,
15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 490, 495–506 (2014) (discussing the TSCA’s “[p]oor [t]rack
[r]ecord”); Noah Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future
of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1825–31 (2009) (discussing
the “TSCA’s [t]roubles”). For a similar set of criticisms aimed at FIFRA, see
Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in
EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
103, 110–20 (2001).
7. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721 (2008)
(laying out principles for reform without proposing a regulatory approach
aimed directly at cumulative risk).
8. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1679, at 61 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (“Oftentimes an
unreasonable risk will be presented because of the interrelationship or cumulative impact of a number of different substances or mixtures. The conferees
intend that the Administrator have authority to protect health and the environment in such situations.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 33 (1976)
(“Because of the multiple avenues by which humans and the environment are
exposed to a substance or mixture and because substances and mixtures do
not occur in the environment in isolation, risks may result from complex interactions or because of cumulative effects.”).
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risks of pesticides in the limited areas of food residues. This
amendment, in fact, inspired the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a framework for cumulative risk
assessment, touting its importance to understanding how
10
chemicals proliferation impacts human health.
One should be careful, however, not to conflate regulatory
potential or nonbinding frameworks with regulatory action. In
fact, while there is some regulatory potential in the area of cumulative risk assessment, that promise is yet untapped. To
date, cumulative risk exists only at the regulatory fringe. Without a concerted effort to bring the issues to the forefront, the
trend toward a myopic, chemical-by-chemical analysis of the
risks is likely to continue. In 2016, President Obama signed
chemical reform legislation in law: the Frank R. Lautenberg
Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (“new Act” or “Chemical Safety Act”). That Act, like its predecessor, is largely silent
on how and whether to integrate concerns about cumulative
risk into the new framework.
How can this be? It is, after all, no secret that we live in a
world full of chemicals. Not infrequently, the popular press
runs a feature article reminding us that “chemicals are every11
where,” that chemicals commonly used in consumer products
9. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110
Stat. 1489 (2012) (amended FIFRA by setting a safety limit on pesticide residues on food for the first time in history); see also 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2012).
Those safety limits are supposed to be set after evaluating the aggregate exposure to individual pesticides. Id. While this sounds promising, the FQPA is
limited in scope, leaving chemicals in consumer products unaddressed as well
as some of the most widely applied pesticides. In addition, the implementation
of the FQPA’s mandates on aggregate exposure have been criticized as unsuccessful. See also infra Part III.B.
10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT, U.S. (2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-11/
documents/frmwrk_cum_risk_assmnt.pdf [hereinafter EPA, FRAMEWORK]
(“[C]umulative risk assessment may be the best tool available to address certain questions dealing with multiple-stressor impacts.”).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Grossman, Untested Chemicals Are Everywhere,
Thanks to a 39-Year-Old US Law. Will the Senate Finally Act?, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/feb/13/us
-senate-toxic-chemicals-law-health-safety (“Toxics ‘are still shockingly common
in our food and everyday objects.’”); Nicholas Kristof, Contaminating Our Bodies with Everyday Products, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), https://nytimes.com/
2015/11/29/opinion/sunday/contaminating-our-bodies-with-everyday-products
.html (“In recent weeks, two major medical organizations have issued independent warnings about toxic chemicals in products all around us.”); David S.
Martin, 5 Toxics that Are Everywhere: Protect Yourself, CNN (May 31, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/05/31/chemical.dangers (“A growing body
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are not as safe as once thought, that some chemicals now have
13
background levels in the ambient environment, and that oth14
ers are found in elevated levels of our children’s bloodstreams.
Those paying attention are forced to grapple with the idea that
15
babies come “pre-polluted” with endocrine disruptors, or that
our waters are contaminated with microbeads from personal
16
care products.
It is also no secret that for decades the major federal chemicals and pesticide laws in the U.S. have left the toggle switch
open, allowing tens of thousands of chemicals to enter the market (and consequently the environment) with little assurance of
safety and almost no consideration of the collective consequencof research is linking five chemicals—among the most common in the world—
to a host of ailments, including cancer, sexual problems and behavioral issues. . . . In short, every room in almost every house in the United States is
likely to contain at least one of these chemicals, many of which did not exist a
century ago.”); Daniel Neides, Everyday Toxins Poison Our Best Intentions:
Words on Wellness, CLEVELAND.COM (May 6, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/
lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2016/05/everyday_toxins_poison_our_bes
.html (“The problem we now face is the incredible toxic load forced upon us
every day.”).
12. Nathaniel Rich, The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/
magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-nightmare.html (discussing
how the toxicity of PFOA, a chemical used in products like teflon, was known
and yet covered up by DuPont and has since found its way into drinking water
supplies from Pennsylvania to Washington); see also Sharon Lerner, The Teflon Toxin: DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception, INTERCEPT (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://theintercept.com/2015/08/11/dupont-chemistry-deception
(discussing
DuPont’s PFOA scandal).
13. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2009) (describing its extensive
biomonitoring program to understand exposures to “environmental chemicals,”
which are defined as a “chemical compound or chemical element present in air,
water, food, soil, dust, or other environmental media, such as consumer products”).
14. See id. at 3 (reporting the widespread presence of commonly used industrial chemicals like fire retardants, BPA, and PFOA in the blood and urine
samples of study participants).
15. Kristof, supra note 11; see also Sara Goodman, Test Finds More than
200 Chemicals in Newborn Umbilical Cord Blood, SCI. AM. (Dec. 2, 2009),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/newborn-babies-chemicals
-exposure-bpa (reporting on a study from the Environmental Working Group
that tested umbilical cord blood from newborns and found traces of 200 chemicals in their blood, including traces of twenty-one pesticides).
16. Rachel Abrams, Fighting Pollution from Microbeads Used in Soaps
and Creams, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
23/business/energy-environment/california-takes-step-to-ban-microbeads-used
-in-soaps-and-creams.html.
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17

es. Over 85,000 chemicals are manufactured and distributed
in the United States; in addition, over 20,000 formulations of
about 675 active pesticide ingredients are sprayed on our food,
18
lawns, homes, and commercial offices. For many of these
chemicals, little is known by way of safety or public health con19
sequences.
Still, at the moment when we should recognize the daunting collective action problem before us, at the moment when assessing cumulative risk and regulating to reduce that risk seem
the logical next step, a curious piece of advice has become a
common refrain: individual vigilance. Again and again we are
told that we can protect ourselves, our families, and unborn ba20
bies by becoming informed consumers. We are lured by the
promise that as individual non-experts we can arm ourselves
with the tool of information and live a healthy life. Debra Lynn

17. See About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, supra note 1 (“The
Inventory was initially published in 1979, and a second version, containing
about 62,000 chemical substances, was published in 1982. The TSCA Inventory has continued to grow since then, and now lists about 85,000 chemicals.”).
18. McGarity, supra note 6, at 110. Europeans fare no better in the quest
to avoid chemicals in everyday life. A survey of British females by deodorantmaker Bionsen revealed that the average UK woman wears 515 chemicals a
day. Paul Casciato, Average UK Woman Wears 515 Chemicals a Day, REUTERS
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-cosmetics
-idUSTRE5AI3M820091119. In addition, Danish researchers concluded that
the total amounts of endocrine disrupters absorbed by two-year-old children
constitute a risk for both anti-androgenic disruptions and estrogen-like disruptions of their sexual development. See KATHE TØNNING ET AL., SURVEY AND
HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPOSURE OF 2-YEAR-OLDS TO CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES IN CONSUMER PRODUCTS: SURVEY OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES IN
CONSUMER PRODUCTS, DANISH ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 102, at 40 (2009),
http://www2.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/2009/978-87-92548-81-8/pdf/978-87
-92548-82-5.pdf.
19. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law To Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment,
53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1623–24 (2004) (“Despite the enormous growth in environmental law and regulation since the 1970s, much of the scientific information needed to ensure environmental protection is still missing. . . . Scientific knowledge is insufficient to identify, much less test for, a variety of
invisible hazards associated with household products . . . . Ignorance prevails
in spite of elaborate licensing requirements that purport to protect the public
health and environment from these hazards.”).
20. See, e.g., MIKE ADAMS, FOOD FORENSICS: HIDDEN TOXINS LURKING IN
YOUR FOOD AND HOW YOU CAN AVOID THEM FOR LIFELONG HEALTH (2016);
DEBRA LYNN DADD, TOXIC FREE: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR HEALTH AND HOME
FROM THE CHEMICALS THAT ARE MAKING YOU SICK (2011) (“There is no longer
any question that consumer products contain toxic chemicals harmful to our
families. But how do we protect ourselves, and where do we start?”).
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Dadd, dubbed the Queen of Green by the New York Times, begins her latest book on how to avoid toxins in the home by saying “I speak to you not as a doctor, scientist, or toxicologist, but
22
as an educated consumer.”
Perhaps because an alternative message is too overwhelming to accept, we continue to pair the reality that “there are
80,000 synthetic chemicals in commerce today” with “the good
news about what is in our control, the steps we can take to help
our bodies remove our toxic burden—and what we can do to
23
avoid it in the first place.” In one New York Times article
about the omnipresence of endocrine disruptors and the longterm reproductive impacts that pre-natal exposure can have on
babies when they become adults, we are given this helpful advice:
For now, experts say the best approach is for people to try to protect
themselves. Especially for women who are pregnant or may become
pregnant, and for young children, try to eat organic, reduce the use of
plastics, touch cash register receipts as little as possible, try to avoid
24
flame-retardant couches.

Admittedly, this message of individual vigilance does bear
intuitive appeal. After all, the message implies that individuals
have control over their own toxic risk profiles. At least for those
with means, time, education, and cultural support, there might
be some comfort in thinking that public health implications

21. About Toxic Free, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, http://www
.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/308971/toxic-free-by-debra-lynn-dadd/
9781585428700 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
22. DADD, supra note 20, at iii.
23. Promotional Materials for Toxin Toxout, GOOGLEPLAY, https://play
.google.com/store/books/details?id=1W5-AgAAQBAJ&source=productsearch&
utm_source=HA_Desktop_US&utm_medium=SEM&utm_campaign=PLA&
pcampaignid=MKTAD0930BO1&gl=US&gclid=CNGiiIGa38wCFUaWfgod
TM0A-Q&gclsrc=ds (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see BRUCE LAURIE & RICK
SMITH, TOXIN TOXOUT: GETTING HARMFUL CHEMICALS OUT OF OUR BODIES
AND OUR WORLD (2014); see also RICK SMITH & BRUCE LOURIE, SLOW DEATH
BY RUBBER DUCK: THE SECRET DANGER OF EVERYDAY THINGS (2011); GILLIAN
DEACON, THERE’S LEAD IN YOUR LIPSTICK: TOXINS IN OUR EVERYDAY BODY
CARE AND HOW TO AVOID THEM (2011).
24. Kristof, supra note 11. Similar pieces of advice for pregnant women
can be found lurking in the blogosphere. See, e.g., Attached Mama, Book To
Help Reduce Toxin Exposure During Pregnancy, ECO BABY STEPS (July 26,
2014), http://www.ecobabysteps.com/2014/07/26/book-to-help-reduce-toxin
-exposure-during-pregnancy (“During your pregnancy, the developing fetus is
far more vulnerable to toxins than you are as an adult. You are your baby’s
protection, so protect your own environment to give your baby the best possible start.”).
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from chemicals and pesticide proliferation can be self-managed
and avoided through some self-determination and zeal.
This sense of security, even for those who can afford it, is
in the end a comforting but false fantasy. Individuals lack basic
information required to understand risk of chronic, cumulative,
and long-term toxic exposure in their daily lives. Even if individuals had complete information, most lack the expertise to
assess the cumulative or synergistic risk from multiple sources.
And even in the fantastical world where individuals could accurately assess risk, chemicals proliferation has given way to an
environment where some risks simply cannot be avoided.
In the face of this broken landscape, it is time for a paradigm shift—one where cumulative risk moves from regulatory
fringe to center stage; one where legal frameworks directly address cumulative risk and stop feeding the fallacy that labeling,
information disclosure, or consumer choice can address the central issues of the chemicals age. More specifically, regulatory
safety standards need to consider the public health implications not from any single chemical but from the combination of
multiple chemicals with common mechanisms of toxicity. It is
the potential for combined and synergistic harm that needs attention. In fact, so important is this need that the failure to
systematize the considerations of cumulative risk may amount
25
to “arbitrary and capricious” decision-making.
To be clear, there are ample guidelines and aspirational
frameworks written by regulators to develop tools for cumulative risk assessment. And there is great work being done by
toxicologists to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of cumulative risk assessment models. But without meaningful regulatory hooks, these tools will sit upon the shelf of good intentions or buried in the drawer of difficult problems. This Article
seeks to change that by showing why understanding cumulative risk, though difficult, is necessary.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how
cumulative risk assessments tackle the real-world exposure
problems that lie at the heart of public health. It shows how
risk science has evolved and why policy, not science, lags behind. Part II then examines why key public health concerns

25. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (suggesting that an agency’s decision is “arbitrary and
capricious” if it fails to consider all the important factors).

2017]

REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK

2321

cannot be answered through information disclosure or consumer choice models alone.
Having established that regulatory drivers are needed,
Part III begins to examine how to move forward. It does so by
looking backward and examining how TSCA and FIFRA have
failed historically to provide this critical public health focus despite room in their statutory frameworks. It explores both theoretical and implementation gaps, showing how gaps in the legal
frameworks are strikingly disconnected from the risk science
literature. Importantly, understanding these gaps will provide
critical insights for how to avoid similar pitfalls under the newly enacted Chemical Safety Act.
Finally, Part IV offers a path forward by suggesting where
current regulatory frameworks could support a cumulative risk
lens. In particular, Part IV considers how the existing safety
standards under the newly reformed Chemicals Safety Act and
FIFRA—both of which center on a threshold of “unreasonable
risk”—can internalize issues of cumulative risk. In the end, it
may well be that assessing cumulative risk is not only permissible under the regulatory frameworks, but also indispensable
to rational decision-making.
Because TSCA has been recently amended, and because
the EPA is required to develop new risk evaluation regulations
to implement those amendments, the timing is right for adopting a fresh and deliberate approach to making a home for cumulative risk in the future of chemicals legislation. In addition,
the newfound attention on the chemicals legislation affords an
opportunity to align the regulatory approaches under FIFRA
and the reformed TSCA to redouble efforts to regulate on the
basis of cumulative risk. To that end, this Article concludes by
sketching a path forward and offering a home for cumulative
risk under the existing regulatory framework.
I. THE POTENTIAL OF CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
Placing cumulative risk at the center regulatory framework is key to protecting public health in the chemicals age. To
appreciate why this is so, this Part examines how risk science
is evolving to address issues of cumulative exposure; it explores
the promise of cumulative risk assessments as well as the complexities. Ultimately, this Part concludes that policy, not science, has been the more substantial barrier to adopting a cumulative risk lens to public health protection.
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A. ASSESSING REAL WORLD EXPOSURES
The U.S. EPA has conventionally approached risk assessments by evaluating a single pollutant in a single exposure me26
dium. For example, the agency might evaluate the risks posed
by DDT when inhaled through the air separately from the risks
of DDT when ingested through drinking water. Risks posed by
particulate matter when inhaled through the air would be yet
another inquiry. The result is that population-level effects of
additive or synergistic exposure to multiple pollutants through
multiple channels (air, water, soil, consumer products, pesticides) are not well-studied. In short, evaluating chemical safety
under TSCA, or pesticide safety under FIFRA, is conducted
27
product by product.
This ad hoc, piecemeal approach has downsides. Most notably, single-stressor risk assessments do not reflect the real
world, where hazards do not exist independently of one anoth28
er. Rather, in the real world, communities are simultaneously
29
exposed to multiple stressors via multiple exposure pathways.
It is only by combining the knowledge of multiple stressors that
one can begin to paint an accurate picture of pollutant loading
that any given community faces over time. For example, a cumulative risk assessment initiated in Baltimore evaluated 175
chemicals emitted into the air from more than 125 facilities in
an effort to identify effective prevention efforts to improve
30
community health.
Scientists, regulators, and Congress have at various levels
recognized the wisdom of adopting a cumulative risk lens. For
its part, Congress recognized the importance of moving away
from single-chemical, single-pathway risk assessment when it
26. The National Research Council’s original blueprint for risk assessment, published in 1983, took this single-chemical approach. NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS 3 (1983), https://www.nap.edu/read/366.
27. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 1 (“The focus of the EPA strategy
to control pollution (and the risk assessment methodology being used to partially support decisions) gradually leaned toward assessing and controlling the
individual chemicals.”).
28. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 698 (“[P]opulations are exposed simultaneously to multiple stressors via multiple exposure routes and
pathways.”).
29. The EPA defines a “stressor” as “any physical, chemical, or biological
entity that can induce an adverse response. A stressor may also be the lack of
an essential entity, such as a habitat.” EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at
74.
30. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 699 tbl.1 & 700–01.
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adopted the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) in 1996.
While the FQPA is limited in scope and has been roundly criti32
cized in its implementation, it is one of the few examples
where Congress has directly required some form of cumulative
risk assessment for chemicals regulation. It is also a good example of why regulatory drivers are needed to encourage the
development and use of cumulative risk assessments.
In the wake of the passage of FQPA there was a flurry of
activity by regulators to study and develop tools for assessing
risk from multiple stressors. This regulatory mandate, in combination with a series of environmental justice lawsuits
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, prompted the
EPA to develop cumulative risk models for broader applica33
tion. The EPA published the result of that work in the
Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment (Framework),
which describes best practices for conducting cumulative risk
34
assessments.
35
Though not binding, the Framework evidences the EPA’s
recognition that cumulative risk assessments are important
tools for advancing the public health goals of various environmental laws: in the preface, the EPA announced that
“[a]ssessing cumulative risk through complex exposures is one
of the Agency’s high priorities” and is “germane and of great in36
terest to all program and regional offices.” A similar sentiment is reflected in the National Research Council’s 2009 Report, which shifted away from a traditional single-chemical
paradigm and warned that risk assessments are themselves at
risk of becoming irrelevant unless they start accounting for
31. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y).
32. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 6, at 147–202 (criticizing the implementation of certain FQPA provisions).
33. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at x–xii (noting in several places the FQPA and its mandates related to cumulative risk assessment).
34. See id. at x (“[T]his framework is intended to identify the basic elements of the cumulative risk assessment process.”).
35. See id. at xvii (noting that the Framework “is neither a procedural
guide nor a regulatory requirement within EPA, and it is expected to evolve
with experience”); see also id. at xvii–xx (“Nothing in this report should be interpreted as mandating that a cumulative risk assessment be conducted. . . .
Rather, it is an information document.”). In fact, the Framework includes aspects of risk assessment that are “outside of the EPA’s current legislative
mandates . . . .” Id. at xviii. The Framework is largely aspirational and “will
serve as a foundation for developing future guidelines.” Id. at xvii.
36. Id. at xi.
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37

cumulative impacts. The risk assessment literature also reflects a call by some academics and scientists to expand the use
of cumulative risk assessments. As one epidemiologist observed:
[T]here is a growing mismatch between the broader, real-world questions being asked by decision makers and important stakeholders,
and the narrow, limited answers provided by conventional risk assessments. To rectify this situation, traditional chemical-by-chemical
risk assessments must expand to incorporate consideration of combined health effects from exposure to a diverse array of environmental agents such as people encounter during their normal daily rou38
tines.

To appreciate why assessing cumulative risk is key to addressing public health, it helps to begin with a detailed understanding of what cumulative risk assessment is and how it has
been used. To that end, the Framework defines cumulative risk
to mean “[t]he combined risks from aggregate exposures to
39
multiple agents or stressors.” Several key features of cumulative risk assessment are housed in this definition.
First, cumulative risk assessments do not simply catalog
descriptions of all the stressors and associated risks that im40
pact a defined population. Rather, cumulative risk assess-

37. See also Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 697 (“CRAs are meant to increase the relevance of risk assessments, providing decision makers with information based on real world exposure scenarios that improve the characterization of actual risks and hazards.”).
38. Ken Sexton, Cumulative Risk Assessment: An Overview of Methodological Approaches for Evaluating Combined Health Effects from Exposure to
Multiple Environmental Stressors, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 370,
371 (2012) (citations omitted).
39
39. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 72. Stressors go beyond chemicals—they can include low income, depressed community property values, limited access to healthcare, psychosocial stress, and other non-chemical stressors. See Ari S. Lewis et al., Non-Chemical Stressors and Cumulative Risk
Assessment: An Overview of Current Initiatives and Potential Air Pollutant Interactions, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 2020, 2023 (2011). These
nonchemical stressors are important to CRA initiated as part of environmental justice efforts. Examples of physical stressors include radiation, noise, vibration, odor, temperature, and humidity. Id. at 2031. Biological stressors include pathogenic agents like bacterial or viral agents. Id.
40. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xvii–xx (“[A]n assessment
that covers a number of chemicals or other stressors but that merely lists each
chemical with a corresponding risk without consideration of the other chemicals present is not an assessment of cumulative risk under this definition.”);
see also id. at 47 (“Nonchemical stressors . . . can also interact with chemicals
to change the risks either that would cause separately. For example, chemicals
such as toluene can damage the auditory system and have been shown to potentiate the effects of a physical stressor, noise, on hearing loss.”).
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ments study how various stressors interact with one another
and impact the given population when considered in combination. This means studying whether the impacts are additive or
synergistic. Additive means determining which chemicals operate by similar modes of action—e.g., which ones are endocrine
disruptors—and then determining whether the total risk can be
calculated by adding up the individual risks posed by each of
41
the chemicals over all identifiable exposure pathways. Synergistic interactions are more complicated. Assessing synergistic
interactions means determining whether two or more stressors
combine such that the combination of stressors is worse than
42
the impact of the individual stressors simply added together.
In some cases, the individual stressors may have no discernable
43
effect except in combination with other stressors.
Second, stressors need not be chemical; they can also be
44
physical, biological, or social. For example, assessing the risk
of living near an airport would evaluate the impacts of air pollution (chemical stressor) and noise (non-chemical stressor),
45
both of which potentially affect hypertension. In addition, risk
scientists recognize that “[s]tressful social environments may
make a population that is already subject to chemical stressors
46
even more sensitive to unhealthy environment exposures.”
Understanding how nonchemical stressors combine with chem41. See id. at 8 (description of synergism).
42. See Ken Sexton & Dale Hattis, Assessing Cumulative Health Risks
from Exposure to Environmental Mixtures—Three Fundamental Questions,
115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 825, 825 (2007) (explaining that “exposure to noise
and toluene results in higher risk of hearing loss than from either stressor
alone” and that “exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and ultraviolet
radiation increases toxicity to aquatic organisms”).
43. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS
AND CHILDREN 342 (1993) (explaining that synergistic effects include situations where “two compounds, innocuous by themselves, might interact chemically even at low doses to form a new substance that is toxic”); see also Lewis
et al., supra note 39, at 2038 (“A complication of defining the [mode of action]
of non-chemical stressors (e.g. [socioeconomic status]) remains their lack of a
biological link to disease, that is, [socioeconomic status] does not cause illness,
but rather certain aspects associated with [socioeconomic status] appear to
contribute to disease.”).
44. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xvii–xx.
45. Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2033.
46. DEVON C. PAYNE-STURGES & LAWRENCE MARTIN, CUMULATIVE RISK
WEBINAR SERIES: WHAT WE LEARNED 1 (2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-10/documents/cra-webinar-summary.pdf (summarizing a
series of webinars presented during 2012 and 2013 designed to “examine and
stimulate discussion of topical issues important to advancing cumulative
risk”).
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ical stressors to impact vulnerable subpopulations is becoming
a particularly important tool in the area of environmental jus47
tice advocacy.
Third, perhaps the most important conceptual feature of
cumulative risk assessments is their focus on population-level
analysis. This focus makes cumulative risk assessments useful
to decision-makers who are wrestling with questions of public
health or ecological health. In this way, a population-level risk
analysis fits well with the public health mission of many environmental statutes. For example, the Clean Air Act announces
up front its purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
48
welfare.” This purpose stems from the congressionally stated
finding that “the growth in the amount and complexity of air
pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in
49
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare.” The
Clean Water Act, RCRA, and OSHA similarly declare broad
50
public health purposes as the driving force for the legislation.
51
Even TSCA, despite its failings, is rooted in concerns about
public health implications of chemicals proliferation. To that
end, TSCA begins with the congressional finding that “human
beings and the environment are being exposed each year to a
52
large number of chemical substances and mixtures.” Certainly
a risk assessment tool that considers the cumulative impact of
these many chemicals is relevant to the core questions of risk
and public safety. In fact, the EPA has similarly acknowledged
the challenge of assessing the cumulative effects from chemicals and pesticide proliferation:
As of August 1, 2001, there were 19,533 pesticide products on the
market and 79,120 existing chemicals on the Toxic Substance Control
Act inventory. Each year, a number of chemicals are added. Assessing
47. See NAT’L ENVTL. JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
AND CUMULATIVE RISKS/IMPACTS 1 (2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-04/documents/ensuringriskreducationnejac.pdf.
48. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012).
49. Id. § 7401(a)(2).
50. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2012); Occupational Health and
Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012).
51. See supra note 6; see also Kristen Ekey, Note, Tick Toxic: The Failure
To Clean up TSCA Poisons Public Health and Threatens Chemical Innovation,
38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 169 (2013).
52. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (2012).
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the cumulative effect of these chemicals will be a great challenge to
53
the field of risk assessment and to the Agency.

Certainly a risk assessment tool that considers the cumulative
impact of these chemicals is relevant to core questions of risk
54
and public health. Not only is the tool relevant, but it is versatile. Cumulative risk assessments can be used to address a variety of public and ecological health issues at the national, regional, or community level. They can be used to assess single
exposure routes or multiple exposure routes. They can be used
to study a single adverse outcome or understand relative risk
between different health concerns (e.g., cancer, neurological,
endocrinal). They can evaluate multiple exposure routes where
the chemicals lead to similar adverse outcomes via different
modes of action. They can even help assess chemical and
nonchemical stressors that impact a more localized community
and account for genetic vulnerabilities in certain subpopula55
tions.
The idea that cumulative risk is highly relevant to a broad
range of public health concerns is reflected in several case studies that the EPA collected and commissioned during its development of the Framework. These case studies highlight the
current capability of performing cumulative risk assessments,
demonstrating their usefulness in addressing a variety of public and ecological health issues at the national, regional, or
community level.
In one nationwide study, the EPA examined the health effects from 177 hazardous air pollutants, including mixtures of
56
pollutants. The study considered cancer risks and non-cancer
hazards (e.g., respiratory or neurological effects). By relying on

53. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xii (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 38 (“Over the past 35 years, the vast majority of risk assessments conducted by EPA have concentrated narrowly on
individual chemical agents, distinct sources or source categories, and single
exposure pathways, environmental media, routes of exposure, and health endpoints. It is becoming apparent, however, that a more holistic approach is necessary if risk assessment is to remain a relevant and reliable decision-making
tool.” (citations omitted)).
55. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41 (“Cumulative risk assessments may be uniquely suited to addressing the issues related to vulnerability.”) To address environmental justice concerns, some researchers have
worked to develop cumulative risk assessment methodologies that incorporate
nonchemical stressors into the overall understanding of health risks faced by
certain vulnerable communities. See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2020.
56. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 702–03 (describing the NationalScale Air Toxics Assessment (NATA)).
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atmospheric dispersion models and human activity pattern data, the EPA was able to identify which pollutants and sources
posed the greatest relative risk. Importantly, this study was
able to draw on existing, facility-specific data sets that had
been systematically collected though air-monitoring requirements routinely included in permits issued under Title V of the
57
Clean Air Act. Studies like these can help the agency set regu58
latory priorities for reducing community exposures. Understanding cumulative risk for local communities can also be useful when evaluating permitting decisions or facility siting
proposals.
While the air toxins studies demonstrate the use of cumulative risk assessments on various spatial scales, and while
they underscore the usefulness of having systematized data
sets, they deal primarily with a single exposure route (namely
inhalation). Real-world scenarios for chemical exposure from
consumer products, by contrast, will likely require assessments
that are sensitive to multiple exposure routes like dermal contact, inhalation, and ingestion. Fortunately, other case studies
focused on assessing risks from groups or classes of chemicals
have undertaken this challenge. Those studies have developed
methods for assessing combined impacts from multiple exposure routes and for multiple chemicals leading to similar adverse outcomes.
For example, in response to regulatory requirements under
the FQPA, the EPA studied the health risks posed by multiple
pathways of exposure to the organophosphorus class of pesti59
cides (also known as “organophosphates” or “OPs”). These pesticides operate through a common mode of action and lead to
similar adverse outcomes. In particular, organophosphates
cause a common neurotoxic effect—they all inhibit cholinester60
ase. Practically speaking, cholinesterase inhibition operates

57. Id. at 703 (discussing the Regional Air Impact Modeling Initiative
(RAIMI) Pilot).
58. Id.
59. Examples of organophosphates include acephate, bensulide, DDVP,
disulfoton, malathion, naled, Tetrachlorvinphos, and trichlorfon. See ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, ORGANOPHOSPHORUS CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2006),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OPP
-2006-0618-0002&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [hereinafter
EPA, OP CRA].
60. The EPA explains the process:
OPs share the ability to bind to and phosphorylate the enzyme
acetylcholinesterase in both the central (brain) and peripheral nerv-
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as a nerve gas—acute exposure can cause death and some studies have suggested that chronic, low-level exposure can cause
61
neurological disorders such as ADHD. The EPA’s cumulative
risk assessment studied the combined risk from multiple pathways including food, drinking water, and residential exposures.
Because the EPA was examining risks from more than one
chemical, and from more than one pathway, the EPA used the
relative potency factor (RPF) method to determine the combined risk associated with exposure to organophosphates. As
explained by the EPA in its assessment:
Briefly, the RPF approach uses an index chemical as the point of reference for comparing the toxicity of the OP pesticides. Relative potency factors (RPFs) are calculated as the ratio of the toxic potency of a
given chemical to that of the index chemical. RPFs are used to convert
exposures of all chemicals in the group into exposure equivalents of
62
the index chemical.

ous systems. When acetylcholinesterase is inhibited, acetylcholine accumulates and cholinergic toxicity results due to continuous stimulation of cholinergic receptors throughout the central and peripheral
nervous systems which innervate virtually every organ in the body.
Id. at 3.
61. For a popular account of acute and chronic risks of organophosphates,
see Ker Than, Organophosphates: A Common but Deadly Pesticide, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 18, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/
130718-organophosphates-pesticides-indian-food-poisoning. For studies discussing impacts from chronic exposure, see Maryse F. Bouchard et al., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Urinary Metabolites of Organophosphate Pesticides, 125 PEDIATRICS e1270, e1270–71 (2010); Amy R. Marks et
al., Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Attention in Young MexicanAmerican Children: The CHAMACOS Study, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1768
(2010) (examining Mexican-American children living in agricultural regions of
California and concluding that prenatal and early childhood exposure to organophosphates can increase the risks of neurological disorders).
62. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59. For the EPA’s cumulative risk assessment for the class of pesticides known as organophosphates, the EPA chose
methamidophos as the reference chemical and then determined the relative
potency of other organophosphates with respect to methamidophos. For example, malathion, an organophosphate used in mosquito control programs and
sometimes found in lice-killing shampoo, was determined by EPA to be 0.0003
as potent as methamidophos through oral exposure, 0.015 as potent through
dermal exposure, and 0.003 as potent through inhalation. By calculating these
relative potencies, over multiple exposure routes, the EPA can add exposure
risks from a class of chemicals that are otherwise varied in their toxic potentials. For a table of the relative potency factors, see id. at 51 tbl.I.B-5. Other
similar methods have been used for assessing the impact of dioxin-like compounds. In December 2010 the EPA published the results of a cumulative risk
assessment that examined the health impacts from exposure to “dioxin-like
compounds” found in multiple environmental media. DLCs include 2,3,7,8tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
(TCDD),
polychlorinated
dibenzo-p-dioxins
(PCDDs), polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs), and polychlorinated bi-

2330

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2313

Because several chemicals were being assessed over multiple exposure pathways, the EPA used behavioral and environmental factors to develop a “probabilistic exposure assessment”
in order to calculate the distribution of exposures from the var63
ious routes. In the end, the EPA was able to compare the hazards posed from different pathways and identify specific organophosphates that posed the greatest hazard. In other words,
the cumulative risk assessment allowed the EPA to assess
overall safety from a class of compounds with similar mechanisms of toxicity and use that assessment to set regulatory pri64
orities.
Recall that the OP study addressed impacts from multiple
chemicals with a common mode of action. This means the
chemicals cause a common toxic effect by operating through a
65
similar “sequence of major biochemical events.” A slightly different and more complex problem is raised when chemicals lead
to similar adverse outcomes (e.g., cancer) but operate via different modes of action. The EPA tackled that issue in an evaluation of risk due to disinfection byproducts in chlorinated drinking water. In that instance there had been “[s]ome positive
epidemiological and toxicological studies suggest[ing] reproductive and developmental effects and cancer are associated with
66
consumption of chlorinated drinking water.” The study was
designed to assess multiple exposure routes, including dermal,
oral, and inhalation. Because the chemicals studied did not
necessarily operate via the same mode of action, the study tested the viability of a new method—the “cumulative relative po-

phenyls (PCBs). Having determined that these compounds were additive in
their effect and operated through similar modes of toxicity, the EPA determined the toxic equivalency factor (TEF) for these compounds relative to
TCDD. In doing so, the EPA would be able to determine the cumulative impact
of these compounds when added together. The TEF methodology is appropriate for compounds with additive toxicity. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RECOMMENDED TOXICITY EQUIVALENCE FACTORS (TEFS) FOR HUMAN HEALTH RISK
ASSESSMENTS OF 2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO-P-DIOXIN AND DIOXIN-LIKE
COMPOUNDS (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/
documents/tefs-for-dioxin-epa-00-r-10-005-final.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDED TOXICITY].
63. EPA, OP CRA, supra, note 58, at 9.
64. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 702.
65. See EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 3.
66. Linda K. Teuschler et al., A Feasibility Study of Cumulative Risk Assessment Methods for Drinking Water Disinfection By-Product Mixtures, 67 J.
TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 755, 755 (2004).
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tency factor (CRPF) method”—to assess overall risk. These
methods for addressing common adverse outcomes as opposed
to common mechanisms of toxicity have paved the way for cumulative risk assessments of chemicals like phthalates that are
68
commonly found across a range of consumer products.
Together these examples demonstrate that the questions
that cumulative risk assessments are meant to answer line up
strikingly well with the real-world public health concerns that
lie at the heart of chemicals and pesticide proliferation. This
suggests a simple truth: if legislators and regulators are serious about addressing public health concerns, they need to move
cumulative risk from the regulatory fringe and place it at the
center of their efforts to set regulatory priorities.
B. THE CHALLENGES OF CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
Given the natural fit between cumulative risk assessments
and public health implications of chemicals and pesticide proliferation, one might ask why cumulative risk assessments
have not taken a more prominent role in driving regulatory decisions. There are at least two reasons why cumulative risk assessments exist largely at the regulatory fringe. The first reason turns on technical and informational challenges to risk
characterization. The second reason stems from the relatively
few regulatory provisions that require risk management decisions to turn on cumulative risk characterization.
It is difficult to say which one of these challenges has to be
tackled first—will the technical and informational gaps diminish if regulatory decision-making is required to turn on issues
67. The CRPF method is described by Teuschler et al.:
The CRPF approach is a new method that combines the principles of
dose addition and response addition into one method to assess mixtures risk for multiple route exposures. (Using two subclasses, Sets A
and C, Figure 2 illustrates how the CRPF approach estimates risk
from exposure to the mixture.) The CRPF approach uses information
on MOA to assign chemicals to common MOA subclasses. These subclasses differ with respect to MOA, but the toxicological endpoint (or
outcome) is the same. For each subclass, an index chemical (a mixture
component with high-quality dose-response data that acts [or is
judged to act] through the same MOA as the other members of the
subclass for the effect and route of concern) is selected, and Index
Chemical Equivalent Doses (ICED) are calculated using the relative
potency factor (RPF) approach.
Id. at 759 (citations omitted). As with the methods used to assess combined
risk from organophosphates, the CRPF method makes the assumption of
additivity. Id.
68. See infra Part I.B.1.
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of cumulative risk? Or, would more regulatory drivers exist if
cumulative risk assessments were easy to come by? To solve
this chicken and egg problem, this Section examines the challenges to regulating cumulative risk. Ultimately, this Section
concludes that a regulatory driver is necessary to making cumulative risk assessments relevant to risk management decisions. The technical challenges are complex but not insurmountable. Much progress has been made in developing
methods, tools, and databases to facilitate cumulative risk
characterization by regulators, communities, and professionals.
For that work to translate into meaningful public health protection, however, a regulatory driver is needed.
1. Complexity in Risk Characterization
It is no secret that preparing a cumulative risk assessment
69
is difficult. Risk characterization for multiple chemicals over
multiple exposure pathways requires researchers to properly
model and synthesize several data sets. This process can pose
both technical challenges (e.g., developing models to match the
complexity of real world scenarios) and informational challenges (e.g., obtaining the information needed to run the models).
Challenges include issues related to combining risk, fate and
transport, timing of exposures, informational gaps, and compounding uncertainty.
a. Combining Risk
Some of the difficulty in assessing cumulative risk comes
from the technical challenges of not only evaluating the health
impacts of individual stressors but also developing ways to add
70
up the risk. To do this, researchers have to understand how
chemicals interact in a mixture. In some situations, individual
risks can be added to determine the joint risk. But in other situations, individual risks operate synergistically such that the
sum is worse than the parts. Often the EPA will simplify the
cumulative risk assessment by assuming additivity, because
the understanding of synergistic interaction is still fairly undeveloped. In its cumulative risk assessment for organophosphate
pesticides, for example, the EPA made a simplifying assump69. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that assessing multiple-stressor cumulative risk is “considerably more complex methodologically
and computationally than for . . . aggregate risk assessments or single-effect
cumulative risk assessments”).
70. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 2.
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tion based on available data that doses from the studied pesticides could be added once their relative toxicity was calculat71
ed. The EPA made this assumption while acknowledging “it is
very difficult to prove dose additivity at human exposure levels”
and “studies available on individual chemicals were usually not
72
designed to address the issue of dose additivity.” The challenge of addressing synergistic interactions between chemicals
was an issue that the EPA flagged in its 2003 Framework as
73
well.
b. Fate and Transport
Because the goal of cumulative risk assessments is ultimately to model real-world exposure scenarios, understanding
what happens to chemicals when released into the environment
is an expected part of the assessment process. These “fate and
transport” aspects of chemical assessment include considerations of bioaccumulation and metabolites. Bioaccumulating
chemicals do not metabolize; that is, they do not breakdown
over time. Rather, they are stored in the fatty tissue of humans
and animals and persist in the environment for a long time.
Chemicals like PCBs and other dioxin-like compounds are notorious for their persistence in the environment and bioaccumu74
lation. This bioaccumulating behavior prompted the EPA to
study the kind of cumulative risk model that would be appro75
priate for these dioxin-like compounds. Similarly, international regulatory agencies like Health Canada have identified bioaccumulation as a point of uncertainty in evaluating
76
cumulative risk from phthalates. Importantly, the bioaccu71.
72.
73.
74.
Global

EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 135.
Id.
EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xii.
See, e.g., Angelika Beyer & Marek Biziuk, Environmental Fate and
Distribution of Polychlorinated Biphenyls, 201 REV. ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 137, 153 (2009) (“The intrinsic properties of PCBs,
such as high environmental persistence, resistance to metabolism in organisms, and tendency to accumulate in lipids have contributed to their ubiquity
in environmental media and have induced concern for their toxic effects after
prolonged exposure.”).
75. RECOMMENDED TOXICITY, supra note 62, at ii.
76. Health Canada acknowledged that “[a] lack of empirical data on bioaccumulation for some phthalates also presents some uncertainty in the estimates of internal exposure concentrations.” HEALTH CAN. & ENV’T CAN., PROPOSED APPROACH FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN
PHTHALATES UNDER THE CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT PLAN 65 (2015), http://
www.ec.gc.ca/ese-ees/723C9007-1CBE-427D-BC20-755F25013B53/Approach_
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mulating nature of some chemicals means that the public
health risks they pose can outlive their marketplace presence.
For example, even though PCBs have long since been banned,
77
they continue to impact ecological and human health.
The issues presented by metabolites are slightly different.
Metabolites, or daughter products, are the chemical compounds
that are formed when parent chemicals break down in the environment. These metabolites can be significant potential sources
of toxicity. In its organophosphates study, for example, the EPA
acknowledged that once organophosphates are released into the
environment they can transform into other chemicals called
oxons and that those oxons “may be more toxic than the parent
78
[organophosphate].” Similarly, when the EPA conducted a
cumulative risk assessment for atrazine, a widely used and
suspected endocrine-disrupting pesticide, the EPA also studied
key metabolites. Notably, the metabolites are recognized as toxicologically equivalent to the commercially produced parent
pesticide: “DEA, DIA, and DACT are all considered toxicologically equivalent (equipotent) to atrazine. All are key metabolites that occur in drinking water and have been included in
79
this cumulative risk assessment.” While at that time the EPA

Phthalates%20(CRA)_EN.pdf. Phthalates are a class of chemicals used in
many consumer products “that have been associated with effects on the development of the reproductive system of male laboratory animals.” COMM. ON THE
HEALTH RISKS OF PHTHALATES, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PHTHALATES AND CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT: THE TASK AHEAD (2008). The potential for exposure from phthalates from multiple consumer products (including such as
cosmetics, medical devices, children’s toys, and building materials) prompted
the National Academy of Sciences to call for a cumulative risk assessment in
2008. Id.
77. See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 14-04-035, POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (PCBS) IN GENERAL CONSUMER PRODUCTS 2 (2014), https://
fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1404035.pdf (“Current levels of
PCBs in Washington stem from cycling of PCBs in the environment, continuing releases from historic uses, and releases of newly generated PCBs [as byproducts].”); Beyer & Biziuk, supra note 74, at 137.
78. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 11.
79. HEALTH EFFECTS DIV., OFFICE PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, CUMULATIVE RISK FROM TRIAZINE PESTICIDES 32 (2006),
http://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/triazinecumulativerisk2006.pdf.
Based on that cumulative risk assessment, the EPA concluded that “there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result to the general U.S. population,
infants, children, or other major identifiable subgroups of consumers from aggregate exposure (from food, drinking water, and non-occupational sources) to
cumulative residues of atrazine and the other chlorinated triazine pesticides.”
Memorandum from Diane Sherman et al., Chem. Review Manager, Office of
Pesticide Programs, to Robert McNally et al., Branch Chief, Office of Pesticide
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concluded that atrazine exposure met federal safety standards,
the EPA has recently published a refined ecological risk assessment that concludes atrazine poses significant ecological
risk for “mammals, birds, reptiles, plants and plant communi80
ties across the country.” That assessment reiterates that some
81
of atrazine’s metabolites are of “equal potency” to atrazine.
c. Timing of Exposures
In addition to fate and transport issues, assessing cumulative risk is made more complicated by the time-related aspects
of exposure. As the EPA explained in its Framework: “Because
some chemicals may have the ability to affect an organism’s response to other chemicals, consideration of the time sequence of
exposure may take on an additional layer of complexity in mul82
tiple-chemical cumulative risk assessments.” In other words,
timing of exposures to various chemicals may matter because
exposure to one chemical may make an individual or community more susceptible to a later in time exposure to a second
chemical. In single stressor assessments, by contrast, the timing of doses relative to one another is less important (although
it may be important to consider timing relative to childhood developmental stages).
d. Information Gaps and Compounding Uncertainties
In addition to the technical challenges that experts face in
developing theoretical models to reflect real-world exposure
scenarios, there is one more obstacle to contend with: informational challenges. Even if researchers are confident in the theoretical models—e.g., choosing additive interactions over synergistic—the confidence in the ultimate assessment will be a
function of the quality of the data inputs to the theoretical
models. To that end, risk assessments require not just
knowledge of chemical behavior (e.g., mode of action, whether
Programs 2 (Apr. 6, 2006), https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/
web/pdf/atrazine_combined_docs.pdf.
80. FRANK T. FARRUGIA ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REFINED
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ATRAZINE 2 (2016), http://
chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/EPA-HQ
-OPP-2013-0266-0315.pdf.
81. Id. at 23 (“Atrazine, simazine, propazine, and the 3 chlorinated
degradates common to these compounds all exhibit neuroendocrine effects
seen across mammals and can alter hormone levels in rats that may result in
developmental and reproductive consequences.”).
82. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 37.
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interactions are additive) but also an understanding of dose to
the average member of a population (e.g., exposure pathways,
how frequently people are exposed, concentrations at which ex83
posed).
Characterizing the dose-response relationship often requires researchers to make certain assumptions about human
activity. It also requires understanding how chemical concentrations in the environment or in consumer products translate
into doses. The national-scale air toxic assessment, for example, used atmospheric deposition models and human activity
pattern data to estimate the frequency, duration, and magni84
tude of exposure. In another, more regionally focused air toxics study, the EPA used air emissions data from federal and
state regulatory databases and permit applications to estimate
85
risks on the neighborhood level. Similarly, to understand exposure probabilities, the researchers in the water study used
data regarding concentrations of disinfection byproducts in wa86
ter as well as human activity and water use patterns. To get a
sense of the assumptions involved, consider that the estimations of human patterns in the National Air Toxics Assessment
were complicated by the fact that people move around from lo87
cation to location, which may have differing air quality. Also,
people breathe at different rates depending on activity levels.
“For these reasons, the average concentration of a pollutant
that people breathe (i.e., exposure concentration) may be significantly higher or lower than the concentration at a fixed loca88
tion (i.e., ambient concentration).”
Though complex, these case studies demonstrate that
quantifying risks through cumulative risk assessments is more
feasible when regulatory frameworks like the Clean Air Act or
the Safe Drinking Water Act systematize the collection of data
regarding chemical concentrations in the environment (e.g., air
emissions data or water concentration data). When exposure
results from chemicals contained in multiple consumer prod-

83. Id. at 38 (“Estimating exposure is a key step in determining potential
health risk.”).
84. Gallagher et al., supra note 28, at 703.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 702.
87. Id. at 58.
88. See Overview: The 4 Steps, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
archive.epa.gov/airtoxics/nata/web/html/4steps.html (last updated Feb. 21,
2016).
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ucts, informational challenges may be more substantial because there may be additional uncertainty regarding how contact with a chemical translates into dose. For example, how
much of the PFOA in Teflon-coated cookware makes its way into a given person’s body when that person uses the cookware on
average ten times per week? Or how much of the BPA from a
water bottle leaches in the water that an individual then
drinks?
In order to fully appreciate the informational challenges
that confront cumulative risk assessments, consider that cumulative risk assessments require the same knowledge as otherwise needed for single stressor risk assessments, and then
89
some. This means that whatever data gap issues plague a
regulator’s understanding of individual chemicals are not
avoided, but potentially compounded, in cumulative risk as90
sessments. The information gap for chemicals has been well
91
documented. If cumulative risk assessments were to take a
89. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 44 (discussing how single
stressor studies can “provide informative qualitative information for
multistressor assessments” but that “further consideration” is needed before
exposure assessments for single stressors can be used in cumulative risk assessments).
90. Id. at 32 (“Large data gaps make risk and hazard assessment of environmentally relevant chemical exposures highly uncertain even for single
agents. Expanded assessments that address cumulative risk considerations
(e.g. mixtures, developmental toxicity, nonchemical agents) are a better match
for real-world circumstances but require acknowledgement of even more uncertainty.”); see also id. at 36 (explaining that information challenges are even
greater for nonchemical stressors).
91. For a detailed discussion of the profound information gap that plagues
toxic chemicals, see Wagner, supra note 19, at 1619 (“One of the most significant problems facing environmental law is the dearth of scientific information
available to assess the impact of industrial activities on public health and the
environment.”). Similar observations have been made in the cumulative risk
assessment literature. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 47 (“Toxicity
and interaction data that cover the full range of exposures for the exposureresponse relationship for mixture of interest is usually impossible to obtain
because of limits on budgets and other resources.”); see also Sarah Alves et al.,
U.S. EPA Authority To Use Cumulative Risk Assessments in Environmental
Decision-Making, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1997, 2001 (2012)
(“[I]n real life, information is usually limited on one or more of these key data
needed for risk assessment calculations.” (quoting Risk Assessment: About
Risk Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
risk/about-risk-assessment (last visited Apr. 24, 2017))); Ken Sexton & Dale
Hattis, Assessing Cumulative Health Risks from Exposure to Environmental
Mixtures—Three Fundamental Questions, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 825,
825 (2007) (“Although there is an expanding body of work on cumulative exposures and combined effects on people . . . adequate and appropriate data are
rarely available to conduct a rigorous assessment of cumulative risk.”).
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more prominent role in the regulation of chemicals and pesticides, the informational problems that exist today would need
to be addressed before substantial progress could be made for
cumulative risk assessments. In the meantime, for some cumulative risk assessments, qualitative analysis may need to substitute for quantification if the data sets are not available.
Taken together, these individual technical and informational challenges may result in one of the most difficult political
challenges standing between cumulative risk assessments and
their more widespread use in risk management decisions. That
is, at each step along the way—assessing individual risk, determining the mechanism for adding together the risk, deciding
how to treat the timing of exposures, identifying vulnerabilities
from nonchemical or genetic stressors, accounting for metabolites, relying on qualitative assessments when data is unavailable—uncertainty is introduced to the overall assessment.
Notably, uncertainty need not be a bar to regulation. To
supplement the federal regime, California adopted legislation
92
to address chemicals regulation. In addition to imposing a disclosure requirement, Proposition 65 prohibits businesses from
93
discharging toxic chemicals into drinking water supplies. Because liability turns on specified risk levels, the statute contains a number of provisions addressing how risk from chemi94
To account for
cals exposure ought to be calculated.
uncertainty in assessing cumulative risk, for example, Proposition 65 makes conservative assumptions, e.g., setting the exposure level for reproductive toxicants at one thousand times the
95
actual exposure level.
92. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HCS
CODE §§ 25249.5–26217 (2016).
93. Id. § 25249.5.
94. Michael W. Graf, Regulating Pesticide Pollution in California Under
the 1986 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Exposure Act (Proposition 65), 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 671–73 (2001).
95. Id. at 673. As Michael Graf has explained:
Proposition 65 assumes a lifetime exposure at the level of chemical
concentration in the relevant environmental medium (such as air or
water). For reproductive toxicants, which may pose an acute risk dependent on the amount of a single dose, Proposition 65 assumes an
exposure at one thousand (1,000) times the actual exposure level. These conservative statutory assumptions assure that discharges or exposures are assessed in a preventative manner, in effect taking into
account—albeit in an approximate fashion—the cumulative effect of
the different sources of toxic chemicals to which persons will be exposed.
Id.
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While uncertainty in risk assessment is not a bar to regulation, and while even the act of asking cumulative risk questions advances public health missions, uncertainty does open
up regulators to delay through litigation challenges and rulemaking ossification. Ultimately, the appetite for regulating in
the face of uncertainty, both from regulators and legislators,
will have much influence over how useful cumulative risk assessments can ultimately be in risk management decisions.
Part IV will take up the discussion of how legal frameworks can be structured to protect public health in the face of
uncertainties in cumulative risk assessment. In particular,
regulating on the basis of cumulative risk would require statutory frameworks that anticipate uncertainty and reflect a precautionary approach to chemicals or pesticide proliferation, either by shifting the burden of proving safety to firms or crafting
safety standards that allow regulation when cumulative risks
“may” be unreasonable to public health.
2. The Need for a Regulatory Driver
So far, an examination of the promise and challenges of
cumulative risk assessment appears to present a dilemma of
sorts: on the one hand, assessing cumulative risk is highly relevant to answering key questions about public health; on the
other hand, it is difficult. As it turns out, however, the fact that
cumulative risk assessments are complex does not justify keeping them on the regulatory fringe. It may well be true that the
science could not support a regulatory focus on cumulative risk
assessment in the 1970s and 1980s, when many environmental
statutes were adopted. That is no longer true.
Today, agency scientists, academics, and professionals are
devoting resources to develop better methods and tools for un96
dertaking cumulative risk assessments. Most notably, the
U.S. EPA has initiated a research program called the Cumula97
tive Communities Research Program. This program develops
96. See generally Valerie G. Zartarian & Bradley D. Schultz, The EPA’s
Human Exposure Research Program for Assessing Cumulative Risk in Communities, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 351 (2010) (describing
various tools being developed to facilitate cumulative risk assessments).
97. See Timothy M. Barzyk et al., Tools Available to Communities for
Conducting Cumulative Exposure and Risk Assessments, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI.
& ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 371 (2010); Myriam Medina-Vera et al., An Overview
of Measurement Method Tools Available to Communities Conducting Exposure
and Cumulative Risk Assessment, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 359 (2010). A companion program—the EPA Community Action for a Re-
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a broad range of tools, including fact sheets, web portals, exposure models, databases, and sampling methods to advance cu98
mulative risk science. For example, several web-based GIS
mapping tools to help regulators, communities, and professionals identify locations of regulated facilities, brownfields, super99
fund sites, waste management facilities, and more. One website was developed by federal, state and tribal agencies to
100
provide access to national air quality information. In addition
to mapping tools, the EPA has developed several informational
databases on everything from chemical toxicity data to national
radiation data, to water pollutant discharge data, to hazardous
101
air pollutant data. Many of these tools and databases are
publicly available.
There are also guidance documents available on a variety
of topics meant to advance community understanding of public
health and environmental risk. For example, there are documents providing advice on how to reduce asbestos exposure,
how to identify sources of outdoor air pollution, how to apply
principles of risk assessment to air toxins, how to become involved in the superfund assessment process. More specific to
cumulative risk assessments, the EPA has published frameworks for ecological risk assessment, risk assessment guidelines on chemical mixtures and developmental toxicity, and
guidance documents on issues like cumulative risk planning
102
and scoping.
Not least, the EPA has devoted resources to developing ex103
posure models for cumulative risk. One model is aimed specifically at quantifying the “potential inhalation, dermal and ingestion dose rates resulting from chemicals released from

newed Environment (CARE)—provides funding and technical assistance to
community groups to address concerns related to public health risks. Id. In
addition to the CARE program, the EPA’s National Center for Environmental
Research (NCER) is also funding research “to develop methods and strategies
for assessing the combined effects of chemical, physical, biological and social
stressors while factoring in population vulnerabilities.” PAYNE-STURGES &
MARTIN, supra note 46.
98. See Barzyk, supra note 97, at 372.
99. Id. at 373.
100. Id. at 374.
101. Id. at 380.
102. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 5 (providing table of guidelines
and guidance documents published by the EPA to advance cumulative risk
science).
103. Barzyk, supra note 97.
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104

consumer products.” Another examines dietary exposure to
pesticide through chemical residues on food. The models can
get fairly specific—like modeling exposure to wood preservatives from outdoor playgrounds. Some models even tackle the
105
time-related aspects of cumulative risk modeling. Other tools
106
address population vulnerability and nonchemical stressors.
107
Still others look at child-specific issues of aggregate exposure.
Notably, states like California are breaking ground on these issues as well. To that end, the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal. EPA) has been a trailblazer in efforts to develop a screening method to identify and rank communities
that are most affected by cumulative risk from chemical and
108
nonchemical stressors.
With advances in research on biomarkers, nonchemical
stressors, genomics, and data analysis, there are many tools,
models and databases available for cumulative risk analysis.
Together this body of research may inspire an optimist to observe that technical and informational challenges to cumulative
risk assessment, while difficult, are increasingly solvable. And
given the evolutions in science to provide better tools for assessing cumulative risk, one might expect cumulative risk as104. E-FAST-Exposure and Fate Assessment Screening Tool Version 2014,
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tsca-screening-tools/e-fast
-exposure-and-fate-assessment-screening-tool-version-2014 (last visited Apr.
24, 2017).
105. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 40.
106. See PAYNE-STURGES & MARTIN, supra note 46, at 2 (discussing in generalities the Cumulative Environmental Vulnerability Analysis (CEVA) and
the California EPA’s CalEnviroScreen models). See generally Teresa Chahine
et al., Modeling Joint Exposures and Health Outcomes for Cumulative Risk
Assessment: The Case of Radon and Smoking, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB.
HEALTH 3688 (2011) (examining residential radon levels to make generalizations about chemical and non-chemical stressors).
107. See generally Paloma I. Beamer, Relative Pesticide and Exposure
Route Contribution to Aggregate and Cumulative Dose in Young Farmworker
Children, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 73 (2012) (utilizing the ChildSpecific Aggregate Cumulative Human Exposure and Dose framework to
quantify exposure in young farmworker children).
108. Laura Meehan August, Methodological Considerations in Screening
for Cumulative Environmental Health Impacts: Lessons Learned from a Pilot
Study in California, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 3069, 3070 (2012);
Ganlin Huang & Jonathan K. London, Cumulative Environmental Vulnerability and Environmental Justice in California’s San Joaquin Valley, 9 INT’L J.
ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 1593, 1594 (2012); James L. Sadd, Playing It Safe:
Assessing Cumulative Impact and Social Vulnerability Through an Environmental Justice Screening Method in the South Coast Air Basin, California, 8
INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 1441, 1454–56 (2011).
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sessment to have become more of a driver in environmental and
public health regulation. This has not been the case.
Despite progress on the technical side, and with the possible exception of state-led efforts in California, risk assessment
109
practice has “lagged behind the science.” Within EPA program offices, there is no agency-wide policy for considering cu110
mulative risks when making environmental decisions. To be
sure, there have been statements of support, urging the importance of cumulative risk assessments. There have also been
guidance documents in support of efforts to assess cumulative
risk. And yet, cumulative risk assessments exist largely in the
context of voluntary and informational measures. The EPA’s
framework on cumulative risk assessment is “[n]either a proce111
dural guide nor a regulatory requirement.” The risk assessment literature more often speaks in terms of developing tools
to “empower communities with information” than to meet regu112
latory requirements. To that end, the EPA developed a webbased tool, the Community-Focused Exposure and Risk Screening Tool (C-FERST), which is meant to be a “one-stop shopping
tool” that makes exposure models, information databases, and
113
guidance documents available in the same place.
Of course, no part of this critique is meant to suggest that
community empowerment is ill-advised. Rather this serves to
highlight the fact that regulatory frameworks are not featured
prominently as the endpoint for risk characterization efforts.
Indeed, there is a separation between risk assessment efforts

109. Margaret M. MacDonell et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment Toolbox:
Methods and Approaches for the Practitioner, J. TOXICOLOGY, 2013, at 1, 2
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/310904 (“Despite the increase in relevant analyses and reports, the translation of a more fully integrated approach to practice has lagged behind the science. With various groups and individual community members unaware of available tools that could be used to assess
cumulative risk, explicit applications have been relatively modest.”).
110. Alves, supra note 91, at 1997; see also id. (“Some EPA offices make
decisions as if they do not have the authority to use cumulative risk assessments.”).
111. MacDonell, supra note 109.
112. Zartarian & Schultz, supra note 96, at 357; see also Barzyk, supra
note 97 (“Community-based risk assessments have been gaining momentum
as community groups become involved in identifying, prioritizing, and mitigating their environmental concerns.”).
113. Pamela R.D. Williams et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment (CRA):
Transforming the Way We Assess Health Risks, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 10868,
10871 (2012), http://pub.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es3025353 (describing CFERST as a “flagship tool”).
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114

and risk management decisions. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has been conducting a series of biomonitoring studies since 1999, whereby the CDC measures various chemicals
in people’s blood and urine to assess the levels of chemical ab115
sorption across the general population. The results of these
CDC assessments highlight that while individual products or
chemicals might not raise safety concerns, the collective exposure may be quite alarming. And yet, the CDC reports are informational only; they do not provide regulatory recommenda116
Similarly, some cumulative risk assessments
tions.
undertaken by the EPA, like the dioxin assessment, emphasize
that the work is not binding.
Ultimately these observations point to a simple assertion:
for cumulative risk assessment to move from regulatory fringe,
there need to be regulatory drivers. The problem with taking a
cumulative risk focus to public health regulation is not a barrier of science, but policy. In fact, while the science has evolved,
the legal frameworks have remained stagnant. The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) is one of the few examples of a regulatory command that puts issues of cumulative risk at the center
117
of public health standards. Not surprisingly, much of the recent work that has been done on cumulative risks of chemicals
or pesticides has cited the FQPA mandates as the impetus for
118
that work. Outside of limited legal contexts, however, cumulative risk assessments have assumed only an ad hoc, informational role. In fact, relative to the number of questions that
regularly emerge regarding exposure to chemicals in all aspects

114. P. Calow & V.E. Forbes, Making the Relationship Between Risk Assessment and Risk Management More Intimate, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8095,
8096 (2013).
115. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CHEMICALS 1 (2009), https://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/fourthreport.pdf.
The CDC released its Fourth National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals in 2009 and provided updates to its tables in 2015. See
generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS, UPDATED TABLES (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/pdf/
FourthReport_UpdatedTables_Feb2015.pdf.
116. See National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals:
Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc
.gov/exposurereport/faq.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
117. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT app. E (2003).
118. See, e.g., Beamer, supra note 107, at 73.
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of daily life, very little work has been done to find answers from
a cumulative risk perspective. And when that work has been
done, it does not always have an obvious or prominent home in
the risk management decisions.
II. THE NECESSITY OF REGULATING CUMULATIVE
RISK
So far, this Article has examined why cumulative risk assessments are a good fit for addressing population-level risks
posed by chemicals and pesticide proliferation. To understand
why regulating cumulative risk is not just a good idea but also
necessary to protecting public health, consider the alternative:
when regulatory frameworks ignore issues of cumulative risk,
or when chemicals and pesticide regulations are weak, individuals are left to assess and manage their own risk from countless consumer products and environmental sources.
This is precisely the situation that existing legal frameworks have created. In fact, an important backdrop to the story
of failed chemicals regulation in the United States may be the
promotion of the idea that individual consumers are the masters of their own fate. For example, there is no shortage of helpful hints from the blogosphere, books, news articles, or NGOs
on how to protect ourselves in a world laced with chemicals. In
one article, the Washington Post provides tips for avoiding toxic
bisphenol-S, which is the chemical sometimes used to replace
119
the controversial bisphenol-A in BPA-free products. Among
the long list of items to avoid, we find “tissue paper and toilet
120
paper.” From the reporters at CNN we are told to avoid
121
shampoo with fragrances. From the Environmental Working
122
Group we are told to buy organic whenever possible. Of

119. Amy Ellis Nutt, How To Avoid Products with Toxic Biphenol-S, WASH.
POST (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/
wp/2015/01/13/how-to-avoid-products-with-toxic-bisphenol-s. Also on the list
are hard plastic sports bottles, plastic food storage containers, food wrap, hard
and flexible packaging, deli containers, plastic bags, baby bottle components
(nipple, ring, liner, etc.), plastic dinnerware and plates, non-stick cookware,
plastic cleaning products, thermal receipt paper, and canned foods and drinks.
Id.
120. Id.
121. See Martin, supra note 11.
122. Frequently Asked Questions About Produce and Pesticides: Should We
Eat More Fruits and Vegetables? What About Pesticide Residues?, ENVTL.
WORKING GROUP, https://www.ewg.org/foodnews/faq.php#question_8 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
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course this helpful advice usually comes with the caveat that “it
is nearly impossible to not be exposed to plastic in the course of
123
a day.”
When the problems of chemicals and pesticide proliferation
are viewed from a public health lens, it may seem obvious to
some that individuals cannot manage the fallout on their
124
own. At the same time, disclosure regulation has found traction in many areas of regulatory decision-making and certainly
has appeal from a freedom of choice perspective. Some reflection on the scholarly discourse surrounding disclosure regulation is, therefore, warranted. To that end, this Part begins by
considering the general support for and criticisms of disclosure
as a regulatory tool. After surveying the existing discourse
rules, this Part goes on to explain why, when viewed with an
appreciation for cumulative risk, disclosure is a nonsensical
approach to chemicals and pesticide regulation. In the end, the
inability of individuals to manage their own risk from the multitude of chemical and pesticides that are encountered in daily
life is not just an argument against relying on information disclosure; it is an argument for directly addressing public health
concerns by regulating cumulative risk.
A. DISCLOSURE REGULATION AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL
Disclosure regulation relies on the dissemination of information to the public as a means of facilitating consumer choice
and ultimately allowing public pressure to encourage selfregulatory corporate behavior. This governance tool has deep
125
and wide roots in American regulatory regimes. In what Pro-

123. Nutt, supra note 119.
124. Non-experts would understandably have difficulty sorting out conflicting scientific reports and counter-narratives from industry groups. See David
Heath, Contesting the Science of Smoking, THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/low-tar-cigarettes/481116 (comparing the strategies used by the chemicals industry with those used by tobacco industry in manufacturing doubt with respect to health data). See generally
NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO
GLOBAL WARMING (2010); MERCHANTS OF DOUBT, http://www
.merchantsofdoubt.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“The troubling story of how
a cadre of influential scientists have clouded public understanding of scientific
facts to advance a political and economic agenda.”).
125. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999) (“[M]any statutes
and regulations now require the disclosure or even the production of information.”).
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fessors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schnieder have since called
126
the “Disclosure Empire,” information disclosure requirements
have played a role in myriad legal frameworks from financial
regulations to fuel efficiency standards, and pension plans to
127
college promotional brochures. Professor Cass Sunstein has
likewise observed that “[t]raditionally, information production
and disclosure have been considered an appropriate regulatory
response to market failures that stem from asymmetric or in128
adequate information.”
The idea that government should reduce regulatory burdens and encourage freedom of choice for the public has also
found traction in Executive Order 13563, issued by the Obama
administration: “Where relevant, feasible, and consistent with
regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by law, each
agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches that
reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice
129
for the public.”
Among legal scholars, the support for information disclosure runs the gamut from using disclosure as a complement to
substantive regulation to relying on disclosure as a substitute
for substantive regulation. Professor Cass Sunstein argues
“from the standpoint of efficiency, information remedies can be
better than either command-and-control regulation or reliance
130
on unregulated markets alone.” The information, he explains,
allows citizens to oversee and assess government regulation. In
this way, “[a] well-functioning system of deliberative democracy
131
requires a certain degree of information.” Similarly, Professors Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer have advocated disclosure laws
126. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665 (2011) (“The great paradox of the Disclosure Empire is that even as it grows, so also grows the evidence that mandated disclosure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.”).
127. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1366–67 (2011); see also Jacob Alderice, The Informed Student-Consumer: Regulating For-Profit Colleges by Disclosure, 50 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 215, 247 (2015) (discussing the role of information disclosure in
the regulation of for-profit colleges); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail:
Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1224 (2013).
128. Sunstein, supra note 127 (describing the various areas in which disclosure regulation has been used).
129. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011); see
also id. at 3821 (including information disclosure as one an example of an appropriate regulatory tool).
130. Sunstein, supra note 125, at 625.
131. Id.
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as a cost effective regulatory approach that respects the different risk tolerances among various individuals: “hazard warnings potentially can work through the market by providing consumers and workers with needed information” and
“permit[ting] people to make choices consistent with their own
risk-cost balancing rather than being subject to uniform regulatory standards that almost invariably fail to recognize such dif132
ferences in individuals’ willingness to bear risk.” In a rhetorical twist, Professor Katherine Renshaw argues that
information disclosure is beneficial because it “can demonstrate
regulatory failings and thus has the potential to shift political
and grassroots support towards developing stronger ex ante
133
controls.”
Within the particular area of environmental regulation,
disclosure as a regulatory driver has at times been celebrated
134
as well. As Professor David Case has observed, “Advocates of
informational regulation argue that public distribution of information can lead to self-regulatory improvement in the envi135
ronmental performance of business and industry.” Most frequently, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) has been held out as
an example of how information disclosure regimes can result in
136
desired behavioral shifts.
132. W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 25 CATO. REV. BUS.
& GOV’T: REG. 54, 60 (2002); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 152 (2005) (urging that government
regulation should respect the fact the people have various appetites and tolerances for risk). But cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically
Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 127, 127–57 (2014) (arguing for the use of default rules to preserve
consumer choice while encouraging “greener choices”).
133. Katherine Renshaw, Sounding Alarms: Does Informational Regulation
Help or Hinder Environmentalism?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 654, 658 (2006).
134. See David Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REV. 10773, 10773 (2007) (“[I]nformation
disclosure has emerged as a key component of strategies to promote more effective, less costly alternatives to command-and-control regulation. A number
of consensus-building forums, expert panels, and policy reports argue that
public distribution of information can serve as an effective policy tool for driving improvements in environmental performance.”).
135. David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49,
76–78 (2014).
136. Id. at 77. (“The perception that informational regulatory strategies
can successfully create conditions leading to desireable self-regulatory environmental behavior is largely fueled by the relative success of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).”); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a

2348

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2313

The TRI, created by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986, requires manufacturing facilities to submit annual data to the EPA on the amount
137
of certain chemicals released into the air, water, or land. The
EPA compiles that information into the TRI, which is publically
available and has been used by media outlets and groups like
138
the Environmental Defense to generate facility “Scorecards.”
The public pressure generated by the TRI has been credited for
139
a forty percent reduction in the covered chemicals.
Even famously progressive states like California have
made information disclosure the centerpiece of chemical regulation laws adopted to supplement the federal regime. For example, California Proposition 65 prohibits manufacturers from
exposing any person to carcinogens or reproductive toxins
140
without providing a clear and reasonable warning. The labels
are generally generic, typically some version of “WARNING:
This product may contain a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer, or birth defects or other reproductive
141
harm.” While there have been some benefits of the inforNew Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 261–62 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 127, at
1384 (“Available evidence indicates that the TRI has had beneficial effects,
helping to spur reductions in toxic releases throughout the United States.”).
Outside the TRI context, information disclosure as an approach to environmental problems has found cabined support as well. See Sarah E. Light,
NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies,
87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 519 (2013) (“Accurate information can promote and facilitate better technology-based direct regulation, more tailored health-based regulations, improved market approaches through the identification of negative
or positive externalities, and social norms that promote environmental goals
and aspirations.”).
137. Case, supra note 135, at 77.
138. Case, supra note 134, at 10775.
139. Id.; see also Case, supra note 135, at 77; Archon Fung & Dara
O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots, Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL.
MGMT. 115, 120–21 (2000) (surveying how citizen groups use TRI data and
finding that “85% of respondents reported that they used it to exert public
pressure on facilities and 58% reported that targeted facilities eventually pursued source reduction efforts”).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2016), preempted by
People v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., No. CGC-01-402975, 2006 WL 1544384
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2006) (“No person in the course of doing business
shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known
to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear
and reasonable warning to such individual . . . .”).
141. Michael Barsa, Note, California’s Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1997) (quoting CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 22. § 12601(b)(4)(D) (1991)).
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mation law in terms of incentives on manufacturers to design
142
safer products in order to avoid warning labels, California
Proposition 65 leaves members of the public to decipher warn143
ing signs posted in parking lots, banks, apartment complexes,
144
and even Disneyland.
Not all of the attention on information disclosure within
environmental law has been positive, however. Margot Pollans
writes about consumer decisions in response to food labeling
and argues that “[p]rovision of information might be counterproductive or ineffectual, particularly if consumer bias or lack
145
of knowledge prevents proper interpretation.” Evaluating future risk proves especially problematic in the usefulness of la146
beling, she argues. California Proposition 65 and its efforts to
influence chemicals safety through disclosure requirements has
147
drawn strong criticism on the grounds that the required
148
149
warnings are too vague, tend to overstate the risk, and are
142. Id. at 1226, 1238 (arguing that the regulatory regime is successful in
terms of raising the consciousness of manufacturers and motivating change in
order to avoid undesired warning labels, instead of defending California Proposition 65 on the basis that it effectively communicates risk); Michael W. Graf,
Regulating Pesticide Pollution in California Under the 1986 Safe Drinking
Water and Toxic Exposure Act (Proposition 65), 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 665–66
(2001) (describing California Proposition 65 as furthering the public’s right to
know about toxic chemical exposure and arguing for a similar disclosure regime to supplement pesticide regulation).
143. See Brendan Borrell, Are Proposition 65 Warnings Healthful or Hurtful?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/health/la-he-pro-con2
-2009nov02-story.html.
144. See Disneyland Attractions Contain High Levels of Lead, Environmental Group Alleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/23/disneyland-attractions-lead-contamination_n_
1023825.html.
145. Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for
Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 636–37 (2010).
146. Id.
147. For a thorough critique of the myriad ways California Proposition 65
fails to provide effective warnings, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning
Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 303, 327 (1996).
148. Id. at 327 (“Warnings also fail to identify the specific chemicals causing an exposure.”); see also id. (“The warnings also fail to convey other useful
information for informed decisionmaking, such as the means of exposure (inhalation, ingestion, or absorption), or information about steps that can be taken to reduce exposures.”).
149. W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 61–69 (1993); Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the
“Right To Know” from the “Need To Know” About Consumer Product Hazards,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 298–339 (1994).
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so commonplace that they are simply ignored by consumers.
Even the celebrated TRI has been criticized on the grounds
that it “omits many environmentally significant chemicals[,] . . .
focuses on sources that account for a small fraction of releases[,
and] . . . fails to note distinctions between more and less risky
151
pollutants or modes of release.”
Scholars outside the area of toxin regulation are likewise
speaking out against disclosure and notice as viable approaches
to solve collective action problems. For example, in the privacy
space, Professor Daniel J. Solove argues that “[t]here are too
many entities collecting and using personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their privacy separately with each
152
entity.” These and other structural problems limit the effectiveness of privacy self-management and suggest that managing personal data is a collective action problem that calls for a
more coordinated and deliberate regulatory approach.
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider argue
more globally that mandatory disclosure simply does not work.
They argue that the sheer volume of disclosures bombarding
individuals under current regulatory regimes makes meaningful digestion of that information unreasonable:
Mandated disclosure is a regulatory response to the problems of nonspecialists facing unfamiliar and complex decisions. It is broadly, almost indiscriminately, used. But it fails to achieve its goals because
unfamiliar and complex decisions are much harder than disclosurite
ideology assumes. Giving consumers information about such decisions
cannot equip them to make the truly informed decisions that
disclosurites desire. Mandated disclosure is a fundamental failure
153
that cannot be fundamentally fixed.

Ben-Shahar and Schneider further explain that the “clutter of
information” faced by individuals by myriad disclosures across
many subjects (home loan, privacy disclosure, medical care,
150. Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 355 (discussing the “overwarning”
problem with California Proposition 65); see also id. (arguing that the volume
of warnings has diminished the effectiveness of Proposition 65 as a public
awareness tool (citing Peter H. Weiner, Enforcement of Proposition 65: Unclear and Unreasonable?, PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 8)).
151. William F. Pederson, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 152 (2001).
152. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013).
153. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 12 (2014); see also Omri
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failed Reign of Mandated Disclosure,
REGBLOG (June 15, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/06/15/ben-shahar
-schneider-failed-disclosure (discussing the authors’ findings in their book).
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products labeling) creates an “accumulation problem” and dilutes the attention or cognitive understanding that individuals
154
can devote to any single disclosure.
Beyond its ineffectiveness, Ben-Shahar and Schneider urge
that mandatory disclosure may be affirmatively doing harm by
allowing legislators to skirt hard regulatory choices under the
155
guise of this “benign” regulatory approach. Professors Ryan
Bubb and Richard H. Pildes similarly argue that the focus of
behavioral economics on preserving consumer choice has led to
the endorsement of disclosure regulation even when it might
156
not be optimal form a social welfare perspective. They argue
that the field of law “fails to take its own behavioral insights
seriously enough” and, as a result, those who subscribe to the
behavioral law and economics paragraph “often artificially and
wrongly exclude[] more traditional regulatory tools, such as di157
rect mandates, from [their] analysis of policy options.”
B. A CRITIQUE OF DISCLOSURE AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL FOR
CHEMICALS REGULATION
While much of the scholarly discourse on information disclosure has focused on the wisdom of disclosure as an express
regulatory choice, Professor Catherine A. O’Neill has explained
that even environmental statutes with directed mandates can
158
be unwittingly transformed into disclosure regimes. For an
154. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 126, at 686–90; see also Karen
Bradshaw Schultz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755 (2015) (explaining that a major problem of disclosure regulation is “information flooding,” the
phenomenon of presenting consumers with too much information to process).
155. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 126, at 689–90.
156. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014).
157. Id. at 1638, 1597. Professors Bubb and Pildes use fuel-economy standards to illustrate their point that truncated behavioral economic analyses can
overlook more optimal regulatory choices: “The upshot of this analysis is that
incorporating insights from behavioral economics into policy analysis of the
pollution-externality problem might turn out to justify traditional commandand-control approaches, rather than more modest disclosure nudges.” Id. at
1676. Critics of Bubb and Pildes argue economists are not trimming the sails,
but merely being appropriately cautious. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis et al., Tacking
in Shifting Winds: A Short Response to Bubb and Pildes, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
204, 204 (2014) (“[C]hoicepreserving approaches into policymaking may reflect
the recognition of uncertainty” and may simply be a “rationally cautious approach to navigating unknown and potentially treacherous policymaking seas
. . . .”).
158. O’Neill, supra note 132, at 276 (“Government decision makers have
increasingly come to rely on risk avoidance as a form of risk regulation.”).
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example of regulators choosing disclosure over pollution reduction, consider that the EPA uses fish consumption advisories to
warn people against consuming mercury-contaminated fish
159
from substantial portions of waters of the United States.
Some of these advisories, though touted as temporary, have
160
been in place since the 1970s. By the same token, until recently there have been no federal standards limiting mercury
161
emissions from the nation’s largest emitter—power plants.
As another example, “ozone alerts” show how risk regulation can devolve into risk avoidance under even our most well162
regarded statutes like the Clean Air Act. In particular, the
Clean Air Act requires states to ensure compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria
163
pollutants including ozone. Despite the regulatory mandate
to reduce risk, over 160 million people live in areas that do not
164
meet the ozone safety standard. In the face of the regulatory
failure, agencies have turned to risk avoidance, using ozone
alerts to encourage individuals to stay indoors on days when
165
According to Professor O’Neill,
ozone levels are unsafe.
“Agencies have allowed ozone alerts to supplant risk reduction,
moreover, despite evidence that the number of individuals who
suffer from asthma and other respiratory ailments triggered by
166
exposure to ground-level ozone has continued to climb.”
As Part III explains, TSCA and FIFRA follow this model
identified by Professor O’Neill, where the implementation of
the statutes has exacerbated theoretical gaps and resulted in a
regulatory scheme that operates largely as a risk avoidance
framework. Because TSCA and FIFRA function like a laissezfaire disclosure regime, it is worth considering why that approach is unacceptable. To that end, this Part extends the work
of scholars who have critically examined information disclosure
159. Id. at 278–83.
160. See, e.g., John Tilden et al., Health Advisories for Consumers of Great
Lakes Sport Fish: Is the Message Being Received?, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
1360, 1360 (1997) (noting that Great Lakes fish advisories were first issued in
the 1970s for PCB contamination).
161. See Basic Information About Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/mats/basic-information
-about-mercury-and-air-toxics-standards (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
162. O’Neill, supra note 132, at 290.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 291.
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in other contexts. It advances three reasons to reject a laissezfaire, disclosure-based approach to chemicals and pesticide
regulation: First, setting information gaps aside, individuals
cannot assess cumulative risk. Second, even if they could, the
pervasiveness of chemicals in the ambient environment means
individuals cannot opt out of the risk. Third, because not all individuals are similarly situated, government action is necessary to avoid disparate impacts to vulnerable populations. In
the end, the reasons for rejecting a disclosure regime are also
the reasons for ensuring cumulative risk is assessed and used
as a metric for reducing overall risk.
1. Individuals Cannot Assess Cumulative Risk
Cumulative risk assessments are too complex for non167
experts to sort out. Risk scientists know this. In one research
paper, the authors discuss in great detail the various tools
168
available to communities for assessing cumulative risk. The
real illumination comes at the end when the authors emphasize
that analyzing cumulative risk requires technical expertise at
every level, from finding the relevant information to using exposure models to interpreting the results: “the compilation of
information from different tools . . . can be very challenging,”
“mining and analyzing information may be challenging without
technical training,” “[e]xposure models often require a high level of technical expertise,” and “their results can also be difficult
to interpret without a working knowledge of exposure assess169
ments.”
Similarly, the EPA emphasized the technocratic nature of
cumulative risk assessments in its study of organophosphates:
“Interpretation of the risk estimates presented in this updated
OP CRA depends upon the synthesis and processing of a vast
body of data on hazard and exposures and no single value in
the assessment should be used to independently arrive at the
170
interpretation of the risk estimates or results.” And if one can
use length as a proxy for complexity, consider that the update
to which the EPA was referring spanned 522 pages of text, ta171
bles, figures, and appendices.
167. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing technical challenges in assessing cumulative risk).
168. Barzyk et al., supra note 97, at 378–81.
169. Id. at 382–83.
170. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
171. Id.
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This and other cumulative risk assessments that have been
completed illustrate why these issues cannot be undertaken by
the individual and/or chalked up to consumer choice issues.
Consider the EPA’s study on disinfection byproducts in water,
which highlights the various pieces of information that researchers have to pull together to arrive at a cumulative risk
assessment: (1) identifying classes of chemicals that lead to the
same adverse outcome requires understanding something
about the health impacts and toxicological characteristics of individual chemicals; (2) choosing a model for how these chemicals interact when mixed together requires knowing whether
impacts from individual chemicals are additive or whether
there are synergistic interactions from the mixtures; and (3)
developing an overall risk characterization requires under172
standing how the population is exposed and in what doses.
The idea that individuals can assess risk is further complicated by the lack of information regarding the health impacts of
many chemicals to which individuals are exposed. The information deficit that plagues chemical regulation in the United
173
States is well known. This information gap makes risk assessment for even individual chemicals or products challenging,
never mind the task of synthesizing risk across several prod174
ucts or common chemicals. Of course, the information gap
does not go away by asking regulators or manufacturers to undertake cumulative risk assessments. That said, matching the
responsibility for assessment with actors capable of producing
or requiring that information is far more likely to address information gaps. To that end, individuals are in the worst position for acquiring the needed information or generating lever175
age to demand its production.
On one level, individuals may be unable to assess cumulative risk because of too little information. On another level, the
problem may be too much information, with the irrelevant obscuring the relevant or the good obscuring the bad. Professor
Karen Bradshaw Schultz has written about the phenomenon
172. See Teuschler et al., supra note 66, at 756–57.
173. Wagner, supra note 19, at 1624.
174. Id.
175. For one reason why individuals may fare poorly in eliciting information about chemical toxicity, see Peter S. Menell, Structuring a MarketOriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (1995)
(“The unregulated market may fail to provide adequate information about environmental impacts of consumer choice because it is difficult to appropriate
sufficient return for generating such information.”).

2017]

REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK

2355

where firms, nongovernmental organizations, agencies, and political parties alike strategically inundate the marketplace with
176
information to influence consumers. This flood of information
serves to overwhelm and confuse consumers, further undermining the workability of disclosure regulation or reliance on con177
sumer choice models of risk management.
Whatever the case may be—too little information or too
much—the bottom line is that even with just-right knowledge,
cumulative risk assessments require some expert knowledge on
issues of risk exposure and toxicology. The many facets of
knowledge that are required to assess cumulative risk underscores the absurdity of the “individual vigilance” strategy for
dealing with issues of chemical and pesticide proliferation. Indeed, even if individuals were capable of such risk assessment,
it would be economically inefficient to suggest that individuals
should be responsible. Doing so forces each individual, even
those without specialized training in risk assessment or toxicology to behave as experts. This approach is duplicative and
requires individuals to unnecessarily divert energy and resources away from more productive societal contributions.
2. Individuals Cannot Opt out of Risk
Even if individuals could assess cumulative risk, and even
if informational problems were alleviated, there is another fundamental reason why issues of cumulative risk need governmental response: individuals cannot opt out of exposure to toxins. Chemicals and pesticides are so ubiquitous in the ambient
environment that individuals have no ability to avoid exposure
no matter the degree of vigilance deployed. The existing regulatory regime—which for decades has left open the toggle switch
for chemicals entering the marketplace and environment—has
created public health externalities that require collective regulatory action to resolve.
As an example of how consumer products can wreak public
health havoc, consider that companies like DuPont that have
little to gain from disclosing health risks from widespread
products. In 2016, the New York Times Magazine ran a feature
article on the rising public health concerns from a chemical
178
called perfluorooctanoic acid, or PFOA. Invented by 3M in

176. Schultz, supra note 154, at 757–62.
177. Id.
178. Rich, supra note 12.
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1947, PFOA has been used in a wide range of products for its
179
non-stick, stain-proofing, and water-proofing properties.
From Teflon coating in frying pans to Scotchguard furniture
180
protectants, these convenience products were sold under the
banner of improving quality of life—no more scrubbing pans or
furniture to get the stains out. As it turns out, the health risks
from PFOA exposure are potentially significant; in 2011 government scientists released findings of a “probable link” between PFOA and “kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid dis181
ease, high cholesterol, pre-eclampsia and ulcerative colitis.”
DuPont, which has purchased PFOA for its use in Teflon
since 1951, has conducted private medical studies of PFOA for
182
four decades. By the early 1990s, results from these studies
raised enough suspicions to cause DuPont and 3M to consider
183
less-toxic alternatives to PFOA. DuPont opted against those
alternatives and against sharing its concerns about PFOA with
184
the EPA or the public. In the meantime, PFOA continued to
185
enter the marketplace and drinking water. By the time the
regulatory agencies and public had enough information to start
asking public health questions, PFOA had become common186
place in the ambient environment. A study by the Environmental Working Group in 2015 showed that ninety-four water
systems across twenty-four states had PFOA levels exceeding
the safety threshold approximated by an earlier report from re187
searchers at the Harvard School of Public Health. In the water districts closest to DuPont’s Washington Works plant in
Parkersburg, West Virginia, earlier tests had shown that public
and private water source “were tainted with levels of PFOA
188
higher than DuPont’s own internal safety standard.”
Open questions remain as to what exposure levels cause
harm. But as public health questions are sorted out, there is at
least one unfortunate certainty—individuals concerned about
PFOA can stop buying products with Teflon but they cannot

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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avoid exposure to PFOA. In fact, DuPont stopped manufacturing PFOA in 2013, but PFOA is still present in the environ189
ment. As the New York Times Magazine reported, “Where
scientists have tested for the presence of PFOA in the world,
190
they have found it.” How much comfort is the idea of “individual vigilance” and “consumer choice” when PFOA has been
191
detected in American blood banks since 1976?
[I]f you are a sentient being reading this article in 2016, you already
have PFOA in your blood. It is in your parents’ blood, your children’s
blood, your lover’s blood. How did it get there? Through the air,
through your diet, through your use of nonstick cookware, through
192
your umbilical cord. Or you might have drunk tainted water.

While PFOA is not manufactured anymore, substitute chemicals that are also part of the fluorochemicals family have yet to
193
undergo safety testing. A group of scientists and other professionals from around the globe signed the “Madrid Statement”
in May 2015 expressing concern about the replacement chemi194
cals.
195
Unfortunately, this story is not an outlier. As another
example of how chemicals exposure is not always a choice, consider children that are exposed to pesticide through drift in rural communities. In 2009, Earthjustice submitted a petition to
the EPA on behalf of the United Farmworkers and other non196
governmental organizations. The petition asked the EPA to
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. “The EPA was particularly alarmed to learn that PFOA had been detected in American blood banks, something 3M and DuPont had known as early as 1976. By 2003 the average concentration of PFOA in the blood of an adult
American was four to five parts per billion.” Id.
192. Id.
193. “Under the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act, the EPA can test
chemicals only when it has been provided evidence of harm. This arrangement, which largely allows chemical companies to regulate themselves, is the
reason that the EPA has restricted only five chemicals, out of tens of thousands on the market, in the last 40 years.” Id.
194. See Arlene Blum et al., The Madrid Statement on Poly- and
Perfluoroalkyl Substances (PFASs), 123 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A107 (2015),
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1509934.
195. Consider, for example, that in 1999 the U.S. Geological Survey found
that “96 percent of all fish analyzed in major rivers and streams contained residues of one or more pesticides at detectable levels.” ENVT. & HUMAN HEALTH,
INC., RISKS FROM LAWN CARE PESTICIDES: INCLUDING INADEQUATE PACKAGING AND LABELING 8 (2003), http://www.ehhi.org/reports/lcpesticides/
lawnpest_full.pdf.
196. Pesticides in the Air – Kids at Risk: Petition to EPA To Protect Children from Pesticide Drift, Pesticide Action Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agen-
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“expeditiously evaluate the exposure of children to pesticide
drift and impose safeguards to ensure that children are protected from aggregate pesticide exposures, including pesticide
197
drift.” In support of concerns about drift exposure, the petition submitted evidence from several air monitoring studies
conducted near rural elementary schools in states nationwide.
For example:
In 2007, an air monitoring study conducted near the Southwoods Elementary School in Hastings, Florida, detected four pesticides—
endosulfan, diazinon, trifluralin, and chlorothalonil. At least one pesticide was found in each of the 39 samples, with three or four of the
pesticides detected in 74% of samples, sometimes at levels exceeding
levels of concern based on end points selected by the EPA as appropriate for assessing inhalation risk. Exposure to these four chemicals
is associated with a wide range of adverse health effects—endosulfan
interferes with hormones and was linked to autism in an epidemiological study, diazinon is neurotoxic, and trifluralin and chlorothalonil
are rated by the EPA as “possible” and “probable” carcinogens, respec198
tively.
199

The Petition also cited other air monitoring reports, as well
as a number of epidemiological studies linking pesticide drift to
200
health effects. To protect children from drift, the petition argued that the “EPA should impose no-spray buffer zones for
dangerous drift-prone pesticides around homes, schools, parks,
201
daycare centers, and other places where children congregate.”
cy, No. 13-72616 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.farmworkerjustice
.org/sites/default/files/Petition%20-%20Pesticides%20in%20the%20Air%20
-%20Kids%20at%20Risk.pdf [hereinafter Pesticides in the Air].
197. Id. at 1.
198. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
199. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“In 2004, a study by scientists from the University of
Washington and Washington State University on the organophosphate
methamidophos determined that pesticide volatilization drift ‘could be a potentially high percentage of inhalation exposure.’” (quoting Jaya Ramaprasad
et al., The Washington Aerial Spray Drift Study: Assessment of Off-Target
Organophosphorus Insecticide Atmospheric Movement by Plant Surface Volatilization, 38 ATMOSPHERIC ENVT. 5703, 5703–13 (2004))).
200. See id. at 8 (“[A] growing number of epidemiological studies link pesticide drift to specific adverse health effects in humans, including autism spectrum disorders, Parkinson’s disease, and childhood acute lymphoblastic leukemia.” (footnote omitted) (citing Sadie Costello et al., Parkinson’s Disease and
Residential Exposure to Maneb and Paraquat from Agricultural Applications
in the Central Valley of California, 169 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 919, 919
(2009))); Eric M. Roberts et al., Maternal Residence near Agricultural Pesticide
Applications and Autism Spectrum Disorders Among Children in the California Central Valley, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1482 (2007); Rudolph P. Rull
et al., Residential Proximity to Agricultural Pesticide Applications and Childhood Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, 109 ENVTL. RES. 891 (2009).
201. Pesticides in the Air, supra note 196, at 4.
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The EPA responded to the petition in 2014, sharing the petitioners’ concerns that “the risks from drift and volatilization
must be accounted for, for both children and adults, and that
202
action must be taken to mitigate those risks.” While acknowledging that drift risks are important and had not been systematically taken into account by the agency, the EPA denied the
request to take interim safety measures of implementing spray
buffers around areas where children are likely to be present
203
and subject to drift. In response, Earthjustice noted its disappointment, which can best be summed up with its observation
204
that “[a]cknowledging risk does not, on its own, reduce risk.”
To date, the EPA’s responses to problems of drift have been
limited to developing assessment tools, improving produce labels, and implementing a voluntary “Pesticide Drift Reduction
Technology” program to encourage the use of safer spray
205
equipment. In the meantime, while voluntary disclosure efforts characterize the EPA’s regulatory agenda, children and
rural families are left with little ability to avoid drift exposure.
In addition to illustrating the difficulty of opting out of
chemical exposure, the example of pesticide drift also underscores the broader point of this Article: protecting public health
requires risk reduction, not just assessment, acknowledgement
or disclosure. In particular, regulatory drivers should trigger
risk reduction mandates based on understandings of cumulative risk.
For one last example on the pervasiveness of certain chemicals in the ambient environment and the growing inability to
opt out of exposure, consider methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE).
MTBE is a gasoline additive, used as an anti-knocking agent
206
and to reduce carbon monoxide emissions since the 1980s.
202. Letter from Martha Monell, Acting Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs,
to Erik Nicholson et al., Nat’l Vice President, United Farm Workers (Mar. 31,
2014), http://www.panna.org/sites/default/files/petition%20response%
20transmittal%20letter%203_31_14.pdf [hereinafter EPA Letter].
203. Id.
204. Written Objections to EPA’s Response to Pesticides in the Air — Kids
at Risk: Petition to EPA To Protect Children from Pesticide Drift, Pesticide
Action Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 13-72616, at 11 (W.D. Wash.
May 28, 2014), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/
2743writtenobjections5-28-14.pdf.
205. See What EPA Is Doing To Reduce Pesticide Drift, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/reducing-pesticide-drift/what-epa-doing
-reduce-pesticide-drift (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
206. See National Biomonitoring Program: Biomonitoring Summary, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/
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Perhaps best known for causing persistent groundwater con207
tamination, MTBE has also been a poster child for the fail208
ings of TSCA. More specifically, ARCO began manufacturing
209
MTBE in 1979. Under the watch of TSCA, it went to market
210
without toxicity testing. After MTBE became widely used, after it had contaminated groundwater and entered the ambient
air through vehicle emissions, after the industry had begun to
learn more about the toxicity of MTBE—only then did the regu211
lators begin to ask questions about risk. Today there remains
uncertainty over the health risks of MTBE exposure. The EPA
at one time recognized MTBE as a “potential human carcino212
gen” at high doses. Little is known about health impacts from
213
long-term, chronic exposure.
Concerned about its susceptibility to contaminate groundwater, states like California and New York have banned
214
MTBE. Because of these bans, concerns about liability, and
policy changes set in motion in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
many companies have switched from using MTBE to ethanol in

MTBE_BiomonitoringSummary.html [hereinafter Biomonitoring Summary]
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
207. Professor Thomas O. McGarity has written about the history and lessons learned from the “MBTE fiasco.” Thomas O. McGarity, MBTE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2004).
208. See, e.g., Bernard Goldstein, MTBE: A Poster Child for Exposure Assessment as Central to Effective TSCA Reform, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 229, 229–30 (2010), http://www.nature.com/jes/journal/v20/n3/
full/jes201017a.html.
209. McGarity, supra note 207, at 297.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 298–300.
212. Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/mtbe/web/html/faq.html [hereinafter
MTBE Overview] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also Kathleen M. Burns &
Ronald L. Melnick, MBTE: Recent Carcinogenity Studies, 18 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 66, 68 (2012), http://www.sciencecorps.org/
Cancer%20evid-ence%20MTBE%202012.pdf (“With substantial evidence of
genotoxicity now available, it is entirely plausible that MTBE would cause
cancer in multiple organs.”); McGarity, supra note 207, at 288 (noting EPA
has classified MTBE as a potential human carcinogen).
213. See McGarity, supra note 207 at 288 (“On the whole, though, there is a
dearth of health effects data on MTBE—a worrisome fact given that it has
been more than twenty years since its introduction into gasoline on a broad
basis.”); see also MTBE Overview, supra note 212. (“[R]esearchers have limited
data about what the health effects may be if a person swallows (ingests)
MTBE.”).
214. McGarity, supra note 207, at 282 n.4.
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215

their gasoline formulations. According to the EPA, MTBE has
216
not been used in significant quantities since 2005.
Still, despite the industry’s move away from MTBE, the
chemical lives on in our bloodstreams. According to 2009 CDC
217
biomonitoring results, MBTE is found in human blood. In
particular, “[c]ommuters in urban areas with high vehicular
traffic had median blood MTBE blood levels that were more
than tenfold higher than those in the U.S. general popula218
tion.” The CDC, like the EPA, cannot say what this means in
219
terms of health impacts.
MBTE has been a poster child for the enduring problems
that are created when chemicals are allowed to enter the marketplace without understanding the health and ecological risks.
But it is also a good example of how the shortcomings of TSCA
constrain consumer choice. In other words, when chemicals enter the marketplace, they inevitably enter the environment.
And depending on the quantities at which they are produced,
those chemicals become part of the background world in which
we live. Exposure moves beyond the realm of consumer choice.
These constraints on consumer choice can be significant. In its
Framework on Cumulative Risk Assessments, for example, the
EPA recognizes that chemical exposure from the ambient environment are generally important and relevant considerations
220
when assessing public health harms.
These examples of chemical risk from the ambient environment underscore how the regulation of chemicals and pesticides before they enter the marketplace is an obvious step to
protecting public health. They also point to the simple fact that
avoiding exposure to chemicals and pesticides is not an issue of
consumer choice, but rather a matter of government regulation
in response to a collective action problem. Finally, these examples demonstrate why relying on disclosure and consumer215. MTBE Overview, supra note 212.
216. Id.
217. Biomonitoring Summary, supra note 206 (“Levels of MTBE in blood
reflect recent exposure.”).
218. Id.
219. Id. (“Human health effects from MTBE at low environmental doses or
at biomonitored levels from low environmental exposures are unknown.”).
220. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 98 (“Because cumulative risk
assessments are population based, exposures due to naturally occurring background concentrations should typically be considered important.”) Naturally
occurring means from the environment or part of background from anthropogenic sources.
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generated pressure on firms to explore green chemistry comes
too late in the equation, after costly damage has already been
done. On that point, bear in mind that none of these examples
even scratch the surface of ecological harms that may be resulting from our decades-long experiment with chemical proliferation. To state concerns about human health, for example, says
nothing about the bees or other ecological resources serving
221
valuable functions within the human-ecological community.
3. Private Burdens Are Not Evenly Distributed
Not all citizens are equally situated to assess risk and
make choices to avoid it. As scholars like Professor Catherine
A. O’Neill have documented, the poor, uneducated are more
222
likely to suffer from chronic toxic exposure. Risk scientists
and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council have
likewise studied the disproportionate burdens of chemical and
223
pesticide exposure on vulnerable communities. Even some
statutory frameworks, like the Clean Air Act, recognize that
additional regulatory measures are sometimes warranted to
224
adequately protect sensitive or vulnerable populations. Dis221. For a popular press primer on the concerns about pesticides and bees,
see Jennifer S. Holland, The Plight of the Honeybee, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS
(May 10, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130510
-honeybee-bee-science-european-union-pesticides-colony-collapse-epa-science;
Alex Morris, What Is Killing America’s Bees and What Does It Mean for Us?,
ROLLINGSTONE (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
what-is-killing-americas-bees-and-what-does-it-mean-for-us-20150818?page=2.
222. See Catherine A. O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11070 (2004) [hereinafter O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice] (explaining
how the EPA’s Clean Air Mercury Rule leaves those most exposed to undertake risk avoidance); Catherine A. O’Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(2003).
223. See, e.g., Peter L. deFur et al., Vulnerability as a Function of Individual and Group Resources in Cumulative Risk Assessment, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 817, 819 (2007) (“The evidence suggests a pattern of disproportionate
exposures to environmental risks among communities of color and the poor,
with racial differences often persisting across economic strata.”); NAT’L ENVTL.
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN COMMUNITIES
WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CUMULATIVE
RISKS/IMPACTS 1–2 (2004) [hereinafter NEJAC 2004 REPORT] (describing a
“matrix of physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural factors which result in certain communities and sub-populations being more susceptible to environmental toxins, being more exposed, or having compromised ability to cope
with and/or recover from such exposure”).
224. See Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2025 (“The consideration of vulnerable or sensitive populations in human health risk assessments is not new. . . .
[The] EPA is mandated under the Clean Air Act to provide a margin of safety
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parate and disproportionate impacts of chemical exposure are
yet further reasons why chemicals regulation that leaves the
toggle switch open and masks ineffectiveness with labeling requirements is an inappropriate governmental response.
The cumulative risk literature is particularly useful in
highlighting the many factors that contribute to disproportionate impacts on low-income, minority, or other vulnerable communities. The EPA 2003 Framework on Cumulative Risk Assessment describes four properties of vulnerability: exposure,
225
susceptibility, preparedness, and responsiveness.
Looking first at exposure, consider that for vulnerable
communities exposure is not just an issue of absolute risk. It is
also an issue of relative risk. As the environmental justice
movement has recognized for some time, vulnerable populations bear the brunt of toxic exposures because of geographic
proximity to polluting facilities. Cancer Alley in Louisiana is a
226
popular image. In addition to intensely concentrated pockets
of industry in low-income urban communities, issues of differential exposure arise in rural communities as well. The disproportionate impact of pesticide use on farmworkers and their
227
families is one example. For Native American tribal communities, issues of differential exposure most often arise in the
228
context of mercury exposure from fish consumption.
Turning next to susceptibility, consider that, even in the
face of similar levels of exposure some populations are more
likely to suffer harm do to synergistic interactions with
nonchemical stressors. A growing body of evidence suggests
that social, physical, and other nonchemical stressors can exac229
erbate the health impacts of chemical pollutants. For example, poor nutrition, noise, obesity, or psychosocial stress can
to protect sensitive sub-populations by considering vulnerability and susceptibility factors in its health assessments.”).
225. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 39–41.
226. Cancer Alley is the nickname given to an eighty-five-mile corridor that
stretches from Baton Rouge to New Orleans and supports over 150 industrial
plants and refineries. For an example of popular news coverage of the area,
see Trymaine Lee, Cancer Alley: Big Industry, Big Problems, MSNBC, http://
www.msnbc.com/interactives/geography-of-poverty/se.html (last visited Apr.
24, 2017).
227. See Beamer, supra note 107.
228. See O’Neill, Mercury, Risk and Justice, supra note 222, at 11071.
229. Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2021 (“Researchers have identified disparities for numerous health outcomes among disadvantaged populations and
hypothesize that exposures to combinations of non-chemical and chemical
stressors contribute to these disparities . . . .”).
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impact a body’s ability to recover from harmful exposures.
There are reasons, therefore, to be especially concerned about
the exposure of vulnerable populations to toxins.
Finally, on the issue of preparedness and responsiveness,
consider that not everyone is equally capable of reducing risk.
Not every family has the means to buy organic foods or move to
a neighborhood with cleaner water. As the literature reflects,
access to health care, income levels, unemployment, and family
mobility may impact preparedness and responsiveness to chem231
icals exposure. In other words, when it comes to toxicological
risk assessment, having the information to assess cumulative
risk, the bandwidth to think about it, or the means to make different choices are all separate matters. In that way, both the
preparedness and responsiveness properties of the EPA framework speak directly to notions of choice and opt-out ability dis232
cussed throughout this Article. In the face of claims for individual vigilance or calls for “freedom of choice” within
regulatory frameworks, it is worth thinking about the degree to
which vulnerable communities are able to avoid chemicals exposure or mitigate situational susceptibility.
In the end, addressing these disparate impacts is a classic
role of government. The Office of the President has long recognized the responsibility of federal agencies to take special care
in ensuring their activities do not result in “disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects” on
233
certain vulnerable populations. In particular, Executive Order 12898 directs each federal agency to make “environmental
234
justice part of its mission.”

230. deFur et al., supra note 223 (“Illness may also compromise the capacity to cope and recover from the adverse effects of environmental exposures.”)
According to one study, “[v]ulnerability to cumulative risk exposure among
primary school children is higher among those with negative emotionality
(fearfulness, irritability, startle responses).” Id. at 820 (citing Liliana J.
Lengua, The Contribution of Emotionality and Self-Regulation to the Understanding of Children’s Response to Multiple Risk, 73 CHILD DEV. 144 (2002)).
On the flip side, “[a]mong adults, optimism appears to offer protection against
a wide range of physical and psychologically threatening conditions.” Id. (citing Michael F. Scheier & Michael W. Bridges, Person Variables and Health:
Personality Predispositions and Acute Psychological States as Shared Determinants for Disease, 57 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 255 (1995)).
231. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41.
232. Id.
233. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
234. Id. § 1-101.
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For its part, the EPA has recognized that the cumulative
risk lens can help answer that call, acknowledging that
“[c]umulative risk assessments may be uniquely situated to ad235
dressing the issues related to vulnerability.” In a similar
vein, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
(NEJAC), upon request from the EPA’s Office of Environmental
Justice, prepared a report addressing the long- and short-term
actions the agency should take in ensuring environmental justice for all communities. Cumulative risk assessment was at
the center of the NEJAC’s recommendations for how to “insti236
tutionalize a bias for action within [the] EPA.”
Several state agencies have made the connection between
cumulative risk assessments and addressing environmental
justice concerns. States like California and Texas are developing screening methods or setting legislative directives to use
cumulative risk as a means of setting regulatory priorities
237
among communities in need of risk-reduction resources. The
Texas Water Code, for example, directs the state agency to
“protect the public from cumulative risks in areas of concentrated operations” and “give priority to monitoring and enforcement in areas in which regulated facilities are concentrat238
ed.”
At the federal level, these acknowledgments and recommendations need to be put to action. As Part III discusses, the
regulatory framework is still too weak to take the widespread
support for cumulative risk assessment and make it a trigger
for risk-reducing action. Without that action, the disparate impacts will continue to manifest, the disclosure fallacy will continue to give false hope to individuals that risk can be avoided,
and real risk-reduction efforts will be buried in the drawer of
good intentions.
***
Understanding the historical support for disclosure regulation in the United States across a range of issues, and examin-

235. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41.
236. NEJAC 2004 REPORT, supra note 223, at 3; id. at ii (“[T]he EPA’s
Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment represents a profound advancement in the kinds of thinking that will help communities and tribes address
their concerns.”); id. at 15 (incorporating the EPA’s Cumulative Risk Framework into a model that is “sensitive to the ‘real life’ context of communities
and tribes suffering environmental injustice”).
237. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.130 (West 2016).
238. Id. § 5.130(1)–(2).
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ing why addressing chemicals and pesticide regulation through
information disclosure is a fool’s errand, helps underscore two
fundamental points: First, addressing public health concerns
related to chemical and pesticide proliferation requires gatekeeping before chemicals enter the marketplace. Leaving the
toggle switch open and hoping individuals can avoid risk if given appropriate information is not an acceptable approach; hope
is not a regulatory strategy. Second, not only is gatekeeping
necessary, but any meaningful gatekeeping should systematically address issues of cumulative risk.
III. THE HISTORY AND FAILURE TO REGULATE
CUMULATIVE RISK
The first two Parts of this Article have laid the groundwork
for understanding why cumulative risk assessments are necessary to chemical and pesticide regulation and how risk science
has evolved to make regulation on this basis feasible. This Part
turns to the history of chemical and pesticide regulation in the
United States. It tells a story of how assessing cumulative risk
has had little regulatory backing or success despite theoretical
promise. In particular, TSCA and FIFRA—the two pieces of
federal legislation most directly charged with regulating toxin
input into the marketplace for the past several decades—have
largely failed to address the cumulative risk aspects of chemical and pesticide proliferation.
While some of these failings derive from structural flaws in
the statutes, many of the failings result from implementation
gaps. Regulators have the room under both statutes to address
cumulative risk. In fact, Congress has in varying degrees recognized that cumulative risk is an important piece of the public
health picture in the chemical age. In some cases, the gaps in
implementation are the function of flaws in the underlying
statutory structure. In others, regulators have failed to exercise
that authority. In still others, court decisions have impeded
meaningful regulation.
Understanding the implementation gaps that have plagued
TSCA and FIFRA provides the necessary context for Part IV,
which examines how the recently adopted chemicals reform legislation—signed into law by President Obama on June 22,
2016—can be implemented to avoid similar pitfalls. Importantly, the new Act contains the same safety threshold as TSCA for
allowing chemicals to enter the marketplace—chemicals must
not pose an “unreasonable risk.” This, too, is the basic thresh-

2017]

REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK

2367

old for approving pesticide registrations under FIFRA. Appreciating how this safety threshold has functioned under TSCA
and FIFRA is necessary to exploring how it might function in
the future to bring cumulative risk more to the forefront in
public health protection.
As a preliminary observation, note that much of the legal
scholarship separates out the discussion of FIFRA from TSCA,
perhaps because the statutes have different political landscapes and policies that drive their implementation. This Article tackles both frameworks in a single discussion because both
contribute to the overall public health concerns. Pesticides are
239
in fact chemicals designed to cause harm to living organisms.
From a public health perspective, then, the human body and
the environment do not make distinctions between chemicals
and pesticides to reflect policy. When examining the public
health challenges of the chemicals age, therefore, chemical and
pesticide regulation need to be considered together.
A. TSCA: PROMISE UNDELIVERED
The story of TSCA can be understood as a tragic disconnect
of what it could have been and what it became. TSCA was enacted in 1976 to address a growing concern with chemical pro240
liferation in the U.S. marketplace. In particular, there were
over 61,000 chemicals in existence at the time TSCA was
241
adopted and very little was known about their toxin profiles.
Despite several other pieces of landmark environmental legislation passed in the 1970s, none had addressed toxic substanc242
es at the point at which they entered the market. Rather,
statutes like the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act dealt with
pollutants and other toxins at the point of emission or discharge. TSCA by contrast was intended to deal with chemical
regulation head on, and as such was heralded by then-EPA
239. FIFRA defines “pesticide” as “any substance or mixture of substances
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest.” 7
U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012) (emphasis added).
240. See Presidential Statement on Signing S.3149 (Oct. 12, 1976) (“This
toxic substances control legislation provides broad authority to regulate any of
the tens of thousands of chemicals in commerce. Only a few of these chemicals
have been tested for their long-term effects on human health or the environment.”).
241. See David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 333, 340 (2010).
242. Id.

2368

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2313

Administrator Russell Train as “one of the most important
pieces of ‘preventative medicine legislation’ ever passed by
243
Congress.”
Importantly, when it adopted TSCA, Congress was fully
aware of the public health concerns associated with cumulative
exposures. Speaking to the basis for the legislation, congressional records reflect the view that:
[i]ntelligent standards for regulating exposures to a chemical in the
workplace, the home or elsewhere in the environment cannot be set
unless the full extent of human or environmental exposure is considered. The importance of considering the cumulative impact of all
sources of exposure and the synergistic effects resulting from exposure to a number of chemicals in regulating hazardous chemicals was
244
pointed out by the National Academy of Sciences . . . .

This broad level of concern for cumulative and synergistic
impacts was not just lip service. The Conference Report expressly contemplates that these types of impacts would be considered in TSCA’s safety standard. Recall that for both new and
existing chemicals the EPA also had authority to take action
and ban existing chemicals that present “an unreasonable risk
245
of injury to health or the environment.” In its discussion of
§ 6 of the Act, the Conference Report emphasizes that
“[o]ftentimes an unreasonable risk will be presented because of
the interrelationship or cumulative impact of a number of different substances or mixtures. The conferees intend that the
Administrator have authority to protect health and the envi246
ronment in such situations.”
The statutory language bears out that intent. In other
words, there was room within this language for the EPA to
have considered cumulative risk as part of the safety threshold
analysis. To that end, the Act requires the EPA to regulate
substances that present an “unreasonable risk of injury to
247
health or the environment.” In making a finding of “unreasonable risk” the EPA is required to “consider all relevant factors” including “magnitude of human exposure” and “magni-

243. Id. at 336–37 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Train
Sees New Toxic Substances Law as “Preventive Medicine” (Oct. 21, 1976),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/train-sees-new-toxic-substances-law
-preventive-medicine.html).
244. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 6 (1976).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1) (2012).
246. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1679, at 61 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
247. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f ), 2605(a) (2012).
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248

tude of environmental exposure.” The term “environment” is
249
broadly defined to include water, air, and land. The term
“chemical substance” is also broadly defined to include “any
combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as
250
a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature.” The
breadth of language certainly suggests that the fate and
transport of a chemical substance to humans, to the environment, and through the environment were relevant factors in
assessing safety. Indeed, given the importance of cumulative
risk to the protection of public health on issues of chemicals
proliferation, one may wonder how agency decisions based only
on a siloed analysis of individual risks could survive arbitrary
251
and capricious review.
Though the implementation of TSCA would eventually tell
a much different story, one in which the Act failed to live up to
its promise of public health protection, several aspects of TSCA
made it deserving of advanced praise at the time of its passage.
Moreover, many of TSCA’s tools could certainly have been useful in the service of assessing cumulative risk. To start, TSCA
created a national inventory and required all existing and new
chemicals to be listed on the inventory. It thus aspired to organize vast amounts of information about what chemicals are
252
manufactured, distributed and sold in the United States. The
253
inventory includes over 84,000 chemicals.
In theory, the Act did more than just create a database of
existing information. It had the potential to create information.
TSCA gave the EPA the authority to require testing of new and
254
existing chemicals where data regarding toxicity is deficient.
In particular, § 2603(a) required testing if the manufacture,
distribution, or use of the chemical may present an “unreasonable risk of injury” and if there is “insufficient data and experi255
ence” to determine the effect of the substance on health. Be248. Id. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(ii).
249. Id. § 2602(5).
250. Id. § 2602(2)(A).
251. For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Part IV.
252. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2012).
253. About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/about-tsca-chemical
-substance-inventory (last updated Sept. 14, 2016) (describing the TSCA Inventory, where the EPA is trying to ascertain how many chemicals are actually being produced today).
254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a), 2604(b) (2012).
255. Id. § 2603(a). Manufacturers proposing to make and distribute new
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256

cause the Act defines “chemical” broadly, the informationgathering and information-generating potential of the Act was
257
substantial. As compared to other regulatory approaches that
came before, TSCA provided a “means for discovering adverse
effects on health and environment before manufacture of new
258
chemical substances.” And because “unreasonable risk” was
broad enough to include issues of cumulative risk, one could
imagine a world where TSCA’s testing provisions might have
extended to questions of cumulative impacts.
Given its broad jurisdictional reach, legislators in 1976
may reasonably have believed that the Act would help the EPA
get a handle on the potential chemical exposure for the public
at large. On paper, the Act had potential and in broad strokes
contained elements necessary for success. It contained provisions permitting the EPA to gather and organize data about
tens of thousands of chemicals. It allowed the EPA to require
additional testing to fill information gaps. It authorized the ban
of chemicals that pose dangers to health and the environment.
And it addressed both new and existing chemicals, defined
broadly to maximize regulatory potential. With the theoretical
tools provided by Congress through TSCA, one can imagine
how the Council on Environmental Quality, in 1977, celebrated
TSCA as a law that “empowers the federal government to control and even to stop production or use of chemical substances

chemicals were required to submit to the EPA a pre-manufacture notice
(PMN) along with basic information on chemical properties, uses, production
levels, and expected exposures. Id. § 2604(a)–(e). The EPA reviewed the information and had the authority to require additional chemical testing if it believed that the product may pose a threat to health or the environment. Id.
§ 2603(a). The EPA could then refuse to allow the manufacture of the chemical
if it presents an unreasonable risk of injury. Id. § 2604(f ). In theory, the EPA
served as a check on the manufacture of all new chemicals.
256. The Act defines “chemical substance” to include “any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including—(i) any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical
reaction or occurring in nature, and (ii) any element or uncombined radical.”
Id. § 2602(2). The Act, however, does not apply to chemicals regulated under
other statutes, which includes pesticides, tobacco, nuclear material, alcohol,
food, drugs, and cosmetics. Id. § 2602(2)(B).
257. In its first year, TSCA regulated over 61,000 existing chemicals. See
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 3 (2008).
258. See Markell, supra note 241, at 345 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-698
(1976), which also notes that under other statutes, “the Government regulator’s only response to chemical dangers is to impose restrictions after manufacture begins”).
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that may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
259
environment.”
But despite TSCA’s hype and aspirational goals, the statute turned out to be a total failure in assessing chemical risk or
protecting the public from chemicals proliferation. The Act, as
implemented, did little more than organize incomplete data
and shift risk-management decisions to the individual consumer. While the many failures of TSCA have been well document260
ed, less discussed is the Act’s failure to systematically address cumulative risk or how that failure to fully assess public
health risks compounded other structural flaws. And yet, it
may well be that TSCA’s failure to expressly tackle cumulative
risk lies at the root of its ineffectiveness. In fact, at least three
of TSCA’s well-known shortcomings can be traced in some fashion to the failure of Congress or the EPA to expressly adopt a
cumulative risk lens.
First, the structure of TSCA largely left the toggle switch
open by allowing new chemicals to enter the market place unless the EPA could show “unreasonable risk.” In fact, despite
giving the EPA authority to require testing or ban chemicals,
TSCA allowed the EPA to exercise that authority only after the
EPA determined that a chemical substance presented an unreasonable risk. Since risk is not necessarily apparent without
testing and adequate information, this threshold created a bit
of a chicken and egg issue for the EPA. In the end, thousands of
chemicals entered commerce with no assurance of safety.
Had Congress more directly tackled chemicals proliferation
as a collective action problem, perhaps the compounding nature
of approving each additional chemical would have been more
appropriately appreciated as part of a portfolio of exposures rather than as individual, incremental, and independent actions.
To that end, the more cabined the analysis, often the more insignificant individual actions have seemed. By contrast, a frank
recognition of the public health concerns associated with chemicals proliferation—one that more deeply appreciated the complexity of the problems created by an open toggle switch—
might have led to a more precautionary approach. For example,
261
the European Union’s chemical legislation—REACH —elected
259. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5 (1977).
260. See supra note 6 for a sampling of the literature.
261. REACH stands for “Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of
Chemicals.” Sachs, supra note 6, at 1819.
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for precaution when it required manufacturers to demonstrate
safety before chemicals are approved for distribution and
262
sale. The United States Congress has come around to this
precaution in the newly adopted Lautenberg Chemical Safety
Act, which similarly requires the EPA to make a finding of
safety before a new chemical is approved for market distribu263
tion. As Part IV discusses, this change will be important in
shaping a new place for cumulative risk in the regulatory
framework.
In addition to leaving the toggle switch open by placing the
burden on the EPA to show that a chemical was unsafe, TSCA
made it too difficult to close that toggle switch even if the EPA
identified an “unreasonable risk.” This second major failing of
TSCA resulted from both structural hurdles within the statute
and implementation gaps imposed by courts. It is also one that
could have been alleviated with a cumulative risk perspective.
Structurally, TSCA limited the regulatory choices available
to the EPA if the agency could show “unreasonable risk.” To
that end, TSCA set forth seven enumerated options and required the EPA to choose the least burdensome regulatory
264
method necessary to protect adequately against risk. While
chemical bans or use restrictions were options, three of the seven regulatory choices focused on information management.
Those choices included regulating by marking with warnings or
instructions, imposing recordkeeping requirements, or requiring manufacturers “to give notice of [the unreasonable risk of
injury] to distributors . . . and, to the extent reasonably ascer262. See id. (“REACH is the first major chemical regulatory regime in the
world to shift the burden of proof on chemical safety from government to manufacturers, and it requires safety testing for thousands of chemicals on which
there is limited or non-existent toxicity data in the United States.”). This is
not to suggest that REACH or the Chemical Safety Act adopted burdenshifting frameworks because those statutes are otherwise directly targeting
issues of cumulative risk. In fact, somewhat ironically, REACH has been criticized for taking an individualized approach to chemicals at the same time that
it has been held out as an example of precaution on its burden-shifting framework. See Denis A. Sarigiannis & Ute Hansen, Considering the Cumulative
Risk of Mixtures of Chemicals – A Challenge for Policy Makers, 11 ENVTL.
HEALTH SUPPL. 1 (2012).
263. See H.R. 2576 § 5(g) (2016) (“If the Administrator finds in accordance
with subsection (a)(3)(C) that a chemical substance or significant new use is
not likely to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, then . . . the submitter of the notice may commence manufacture of the
chemical substance or manufacture or processing for the significant new use
. . . .”).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012).
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tainable, to other[s]” and “to give public notice” of such risk of
injury, and to replace or repurchase the chemical from the peo265
ple who have been so warned if they elect. Because TSCA required the EPA to choose the least burdensome method necessary, even when the EPA made a finding of “unreasonable risk
of injury,” the Act placed a presumption in favor of regulatory
avoidance, namely regulation through information disclosure.
In doing so, the Act expressly made it more difficult for the
EPA to choose public health protection through actual, substantive gatekeeping (e.g., chemical bans or use restrictions).
There is no better example of this presumption in favor of
avoidance than the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, where the court famously rejected the EPA’s
rule banning asbestos upon concluding that the agency failed to
consider the least burdensome alternatives to a complete ban.
This ruling came in response to ten years and thousands of
pages of documentation regarding the dangers posed by asbes266
tos. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling reflects, in part, the structural
flaws of TSCA. At the same time, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may
have generated an unnecessarily high hurdle to chemicals regulation, one not reflected in congressional intent. To that end,
despite the significant study and documentation by the EPA on
the risks posed by asbestos, the court separately ruled that the
EPA had failed to provide substantial evidence of an “unrea267
sonable risk of injury.” Ordinarily, the substantial evidence
standard for reviewing an agency’s factual determination is not
268
considered a high evidentiary hurdle, but in the context of
TSCA review the court concluded that the EPA’s ten-year study
of the impact of asbestos on human health and its accompanying in-depth analysis of this known carcinogen were not enough
to warrant regulation under TSCA. Tellingly, the court cau-

265. Id.
266. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (setting out the standard for “substantial evidence” review of factual determinations made through formal adjudication under the APA); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677,
684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“We have noted on several occasions that the distinction
between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is
‘largely semantic.’”); cf. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213 (“Contrary
to the EPA’s assertions, the arbitrary and capricious standard found in the
APA and the substantial evidence standard found in TSCA are different
standards, even in the context of an informal rulemaking.”).
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tioned that “Congress did not enact TSCA as a zero-risk stat269
ute.”
After that decision, the EPA effectively concluded that § 6
is largely unenforceable. Rather than continue to pursue its authority to restrict or ban chemicals, the EPA turned to volun270
tary approaches to address risks. Notwithstanding the hype,
the words offered by Russell Train in 1976 upon adoption of
TSCA are as true today as they were forty years ago: “Most
Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they were
living so dangerously. . . . They had no idea that, without their
knowledge or consent, they were often engaging in a grim game
of chemical roulette whose result they would not know until
271
many years later.”
It is worth noting that the EPA might have alleviated the
shortcomings of TSCA had it routinely considered cumulative
risks as part of the safety inquiry. If a finding of “unreasonable
risk” were based in part on cumulative exposures, the EPA
might also have reasonably discounted regulatory choices rooted in information disclosure. In addition, by fully assessing
public health risks from cumulative exposures the EPA may
have stood a better chance at educating the courts on the public
health need for chemicals regulation. When viewed as a necessary tool for addressing a collective action problem, rather than
as a limit on marketplace activity, courts may have been more
amenable to an “unreasonable risk” threshold that would have
269. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1215.
270. In 2011, as part of an educational series sponsored by the Environmental Law Institute, the EPA’s Director of the Office of Pollution Prevention
and Toxics explained that:
[T]he Agency has only successfully invoked § 6 five times since 1976.
The most ambitious attempt to use § 6 was in the 1980s, when there
was an attempt to ban most uses of asbestos, a known human carcinogen. That attempt was overturned in litigation that resulted in additional burdens on Agency action under TSCA. Since the early 1990s,
the Agency has not used the provision of TSCA that allows us to address unreasonable risks from existing chemicals. Given the difficulties of using some of TSCA’s regulatory tools, the Agency has pursued
various voluntary and stewardship approaches to address risks from
chemicals.
Wendy Cleland-Hamnett, Dir., EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics,
Panel Discussion at the Environmental Law Institute, TSCA Reform: The
Standard of Safety (July 21, 2011), in 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
11081, 11083 (2011); see also Angela J. Levin & Maria V. Souder, In a World
Without Congressional Reform: A New (Old) Role for EPA Under TSCA Section
6, 29 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 12 (2015) (summarizing TSCA’s poor track record).
271. Russell Train, Former Administrator, U.S. EPA 1973–1977.
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reduced collective risk over time. This is an example of how, in
the end, the fact that cumulative risk has been a blind spot in
the implementation of TSCA may have weakened its effectiveness on multiple levels and exacerbated structural flaws.
In light of the many shortcomings of TSCA, the collection
of criticisms of TSCA found political traction and spurred Congress to action and a new Act—the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act—was signed into law by
President Obama on June 22, 2016. This new Act replaces
TSCA as the new chemical regulatory regime for the U.S. markets. Part IV explains how that new legislation eliminates
some of TSCA’s shortcomings and how it can be implemented to
more fully embrace issues of cumulative risk than its predecessor.
B. FIFRA: MORE PROMISES UNDELIVERED
While TSCA regulates chemical substances, it is a gapfiller statute; it regulates where other statutes do not. One major class of chemicals to which TSCA does not apply is pesti272
cides. Similarly, the Chemical Safety Act will not modify pesticides regulation. Rather, the EPA will continue to regulate
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Unlike TSCA, FIFRA has not been the recent target of any major reform efforts. But that is not to say
that FIFRA takes a particularly strong approach to the protection of public health from chemicals exposure. Like TSCA,
FIFRA suffers from heavy reliance on information disclosure as
the primary vehicle for pesticide regulation. And, like TSCA,
the combination of statutory mandates and incentives created
by FIFRA have resulted in relatively little gatekeeping despite
theoretical promise. So while FIFRA in theory more directly
tackles issues of aggregate exposure, the implementation gaps
that plague FIFRA leave substantial room for improvement.
A bit of FIFRA’s history helps explain where the gaps in
this area of regulation have been and where they continue to
be. The origins of FIFRA are quite telling. When it was enacted

272. See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding from TSCA regulation
chemicals that are “manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for
use as a pesticide”). In addition, TSCA does not apply to foods, food additives,
cosmetics, and drugs that are regulated by the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See id.
§ 2602(2)(B)(vi).
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in 1947, FIFRA was a licensing and labeling law. Like the
law that it replaced (the 1910 Federal Insecticide Act), FIFRA
“protected farmers and consumers against fraudulent products”
274
by promoting labeling uniformity and honesty. In short, it
275
sought to ensure that pesticides actually killed pests. Written
276
under the heavy influence of industry, FIFRA generally allowed for the quick registration of pesticides with few regulato277
ry or informational requirements. To complete the picture,
consider that FIFRA was administered by the USDA, an agency widely accepted to serve the interests of the agricultural lob278
by and chemical industry.
As originally enacted, FIFRA did little to address public
health-related concerns. The use of pesticides was rampant
(over 300 million pounds of pesticides were produced in
279
1950), and yet, health consequences of eating foods sprayed
with chemicals did not enter the regulatory picture until 1954.
At that time, Congress amended the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act to create a program for setting safety limits for pesticide
280
residues in food. However, the laws continued to overlook a

273. Stephen D. Otero, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling
Cipollone’s Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic
Notions of Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 785 (1995).
274. Pamela A. Finegan, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the
Pesticide Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 615, 623 (1989) (citing S. REP. NO.
346 (1988)).
275. Anthony J. Nownes, Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides:
Congress, Coalitions, and Closure, 24 POL’Y SCI. 1, 2 (1991) (“The goal of
[FIFRA] was to ensure that a pesticide was able to kill the pests that the
manufacturer purported it did.”).
276. See Christopher J. Bosso, Transforming Adversaries into Collaborators: Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides, 21 POL’Y SCI. 3, 5 (1988)
(“The 1947 Act emerged out of close cooperation among members of the House
Committee on Agriculture, USDA officials, and representatives of the major
pesticides manufacturers—a classic ‘iron triangle’ in the words of
subgovernment theorists.”); see also Albert H. Meyerhoff, Frightening Tale of
Dinoseb Is Rule, Not Exception, in the World of Pesticides, L.A. TIMES (July 25,
1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-25/local/me-4548_1_dinoseb-ban
(“FIFRA, written largely by and for the agrichemical industry, has not been
seriously amended in 16 years and is severely flawed.”).
277. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 616 (examining a GAO report from
1986 that concluded pesticides registered before 1972 underwent inadequate
testing).
278. See id. at 619 (“During the 1940s, the farm bloc seized power and increased its support of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
with new programs and increased budgetary support.”).
279. See id. at 619.
280. Id. at 622 (explaining that the FDA implemented the safety limits be-
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host of other public health and environmental concerns associ281
ated with prolific pesticide use, including farm worker safety,
282
groundwater contamination, and public parks.
By the early 1970s, Rachel Carson had famously spotlighted the risks of pesticides to humans and the environment in
283
her book Silent Spring, and public concerns grew forceful
284
enough to bring about substantial congressional change. It
was in reaction to public pressure that Congress adopted major
amendments to FIFRA in 1972. The authority for implementing FIFRA was transferred to the EPA, a newly created agen285
cy.
Along with the transfer of power came a number of new
provisions more directly addressing public health and the environment. For the first time, the EPA was given authority to reject the registration of pesticides that posed an “unreasonable
286
adverse risk” to the environment. The EPA was also given
authority to cancel registrations of existing pesticides, albeit
with a rather large caveat: the EPA was required to indemnify
manufacturers, distributors and retailers for unused product if
287
registrations were cancelled. Issues of cumulative exposure
were not directly addressed.
Despite the 1972 amendments, FIFRA continued to draw
288
criticisms from public health and environmental advocates.
By the mid-1980s criticisms to FIFRA bore a striking resemblance to some of the current criticisms of TSCA. Concerns in-

cause the EPA was not created until 1970).
281. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-40, PESTICIDES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS
AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000).
282. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 625 (citing 1987 congressional hearings for the claim that the EPA had detected groundwater contamination from
pesticides in twenty-four states).
283. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
284. See Bosso, supra note 276, at 4.
285. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(a)(4), 35 Fed. Reg. 15623
(Oct. 6, 1970).
286. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2012).
287. EPA History: FIFRA Amendments of 1988, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-fifra-amendments-1988
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also Nownes, supra note 275, at 10–11 (describing the indemnification provisions and the structural barriers they raised to
regulation).
288. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 625 (explaining that among the general public, pesticide residues was the number one consumer concern in a 1988
poll conducted by the Food Marketing Institute.).
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cluded the completeness and adequacy of scientific data available to the EPA when evaluating new pesticides for public safe289
ty; the large number of existing pesticides that continued to
be used despite little knowledge regarding public health im290
pacts; the disincentives that agency indemnification created
291
to cancelling pesticide registrations; and the fact that “pesti292
cides were innocent until proven guilty.” There were many attempts to change the status quo but with little success. As one
prominent political scientist remarked in the late 1980s: “To
resolve a policy battle that all agree only perpetuates an unacceptable status quo may require yet another scandal or unfor293
tunate incident.”
It was not until 1993, when the National Academy of Sciences released a report on the vulnerability of infants and children to pesticide residues on food that Congress was again mo294
tivated to pay attention. That report, Pesticides in the Diets of
Infants and Children, concluded that approaches used by the
EPA to set pesticide tolerance levels insufficiently protected infants and children. The report made several recommendations,
including that the EPA determine tolerances based on health,
not agricultural cost-benefit; that the EPA develop toxicity
studies evaluating neurological, immune and reproductive vulnerabilities of infants and children; and that the EPA include a
safety factor when data is inadequate to evaluate toxicological

289. See Richard M. Dowd, FIFRA Update, 17 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 415A
(1983).
290. As the L.A. Times reported in 1988: “FIFRA, written largely by and for
the agrichemical industry, has not been seriously amended in 16 years and is
severely flawed. Thus, under its provisions, hundreds of ‘old,’ largely untested,
pesticides continue to be used. (Ninety percent of the 2.6 billion pounds of pesticides used annually in the United States have never been adequately tested
for chronic health effects like cancer, birth defects and nerve damage, according to the National Academy of Sciences.)” Meyerhoff, supra note 276; see also
Finegan, supra note 274, at 617 (explaining that while the 1972 FIFRA
amendments required the EPA to reregister the 35,000 pesticide products in
existence at the time, fourteen years later the EPA had “completed review of
only five active ingredients” out of 600 in need of review).
291. Finegan, supra note 274, at 634 (providing for statistics on how much
cancelling pesticides cost the EPA in the late 1980s).
292. Nownes, supra note 275, at 8.
293. Bosso, supra note 276, at 18.
294. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND
CHILDREN (1993); see also Kristina Thayer & Jane Houlihan, Pesticides, Human Health, and the Food Quality Protection Act, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 257 (2004) (detailing Congress’s efforts to pass the Food Quality
Protection Act).
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295

risk to infants and children. Most notably, the report recommended that the EPA consider risks from exposure to “multiple
296
pesticides with a common toxic effect.” Moreover, the risks
should be calculated by considering the total exposure from
297
both dietary and non-dietary routes.
Ultimately, in 1996 Congress responded to public concerns
298
and enacted the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA). Under
that Act, the EPA must set a maximum residue, or tolerance,
299
limit before a specific pesticide can be used on a food crop.
The tolerance limit is the amount of pesticide residue allowed
to remain in or on each treated food commodity. In setting tolerances, the EPA must make a finding that the tolerance is
“safe.” A tolerance is defined as “safe” if there is a “reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to
300
the pesticide residue.” These aggregate exposure assessments
must specifically account for the particular vulnerability of in301
fants and children.
By passing the FQPA, Congress directly addressed issues
of aggregate exposure. In this way, FIFRA and the history of

295. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 294, at 9.
296. Id. at 11.
297. Id.
298. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–170, § 405, 110
Stat. 1513, 1514–35 (1996) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346(a)(2000)).
299. The power of the EPA to set such tolerances comes from § 408 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Setting Tolerances for Pesticide Residues in Food, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
pesticide-tolerances/setting-tolerances-pesticide-residues-foods (last visited
Apr. 24, 2017); Summary of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-federal
-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act (last visited on Apr. 24, 2017).
300. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added). Today, the EPA
considers multiple factors in setting safety limits, including: (i) the toxicity of
the pesticide and its breakdown products; (ii) how much of the pesticide is applied and how often; (iii) how much of the pesticide (i.e., the residue) remains
in or on food by the time it is marketed or prepared; (iv) aggregate exposure to
the pesticide in foods and from other sources of exposure; and (v) any special
risks posed to infants and children. See Setting Tolerances for Pesticide Residues in Food, supra note 299. It is important to note that some pesticides are
exempt from this process. The EPA may grant exemptions in cases where the
exemption is found to be safe and the pesticide residues do not pose a dietary
risk under reasonably foreseeable circumstances. Id. To make this exemption
determination, the EPA must review toxicity and exposure data, the same as
for tolerance setting. Id. In addition, there must be a practical method for detecting and measuring levels of the pesticide residues so regulatory officials
can ensure that any residues are at or below the level found to be safe. Id.
301. § 346a(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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pesticide regulation serve as useful starting points for thinking
about issues of common toxicity and cumulative risk more
broadly—beyond pesticides and residues. At a minimum, the
pre-amendment history of the FQPA shows that scientists have
recognized the importance of considering aggregate risk for
nearly three decades.
While the safety limits required under FQPA are a step in
the right regulatory direction, and while other areas of chemicals regulation could benefit from similar requirements to perform aggregate risk assessments, FIFRA’s bright spots have to
be put into context of the statute’s overall limits. In other
words, the fact that the EPA must consider aggregate exposure
to pesticide residues on food does not mean that FIFRA, or
FQPA, has been successful in addressing public health issues
related to pesticide exposure.
Even setting aside the fact that the implementation of
FQPA has been described as “disappointing” by some schol302
ars, FQPA is limited in scope. Importantly, cumulative risk
assessments are more sophisticated tools than the aggregate
risk assessments required by the FQPA. Aggregate exposure
assessments, in contrast to cumulative risk assessments, simply evaluate a single chemical or pesticide across multiple expo303
sure routes. An aggregate assessment, for instance, might
study the impacts of benzene on a given community by studying the combined impact from all sources of benzene. At its
core, the aggregate assessment is still single-stressor; it looks
only at the impacts of benzene, not benzene as combined with
304
other carcinogens or non-chemical stressors. In other words,
aggregate risk assessments do not consider how the studied
chemical behaves in a matrix of other chemical stressors or
what level of risk is posed to a population from the combination
of many chemicals through multiple exposure routes over long
periods of time. Understanding the difference between cumulative and aggregate risk assessments highlights the limitations

302. See McGarity, supra note 6, at 147–202 (detailing FQPA’s implementation and the unique problems the EPA faced). Much of the law’s promises
have gone unfulfilled and continue to be the subject of targeted lawsuits. See
Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law
Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 89 (2005).
303. For an explanation of the differences between aggregate assessments
and cumulative risk assessments, see EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 7.
304. Id.
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of even current regulatory attempts to move beyond singlestressor, single-pathway assessments.
In addition, the mandates to set safety limits or to consider
aggregate risk apply only to pesticide exposure through food
residues. These public health protections do not apply to a
whole host of other human health and ecological issues associated with pesticide use. As an example of FQPA’s limited scope,
305
consider the fact that it does not address farm worker safety,
nor does it protect families of farmworkers or rural communi306
ties from pesticide drift.
Urbanites fair no better under FIFRA’s framework. Consider that over eighty million pounds of pesticide active ingre307
dients are used on U.S. lawns each year. By some estimates,
pesticides used in homes and on residential lawns rival agricul308
tural use on a per acre basis. Unless these pesticides are also
licensed for use on foods, they are not tested for chronic or aggregate health effects. For example, MCPP, the third-most
heavily used herbicide in the United States, is not approved for
food use and therefore has not been assessed for aggregate risk
309
under the FQPA framework. Last year, risks to families from
pesticide-driven lawn care inspired one county in Maryland to
310
ban homeowners from using pesticides on their lawn. That
this measure regulated private lands was unusual. States like
Connecticut have banned the use of certain pesticides on public
lands, but have prohibited localities from regulating pesticide
311
use on private lands.
305. Cf. Scott Cook, Farm Children as a “Major Identifiable Subgroup” for
Setting Tolerances Under the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1121 (2003) (arguing that the FQPA should protect farmworkers).
306. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the litigation concerning impacts to farmworkers and children from pesticide drift. See also Petition, supra
note 196; Cynthia L. Curl et al., Evaluation of Take-Home Organophosphorus
Pesticide Exposure Among Agricultural Workers and Their Children, 12
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 110 (2002) (discussing the problem of pesticide drift
for farmworkers and their families).
307. JOHN WARGO ET AL., RISKS FROM LAWN-CARE PESTICIDES (2003).
308. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in a report on lawn care and frogs,
asserted that “homeowners use up to 10 times more chemical pesticides per
acre on their lawns than farmers use on crops.” See id. at 6.
309. See id. at 7.
310. Bill Turque, MoCo Becomes First Major Locality To Ban Cosmetic Pesticides from Lawns, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/md-politics/moco-becomes-first-major-locality-to-ban-cosmetic
-pesticides-from-lawns/2015/10/06/ccb5df9a-6c55-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_
story.html.
311. Connecticut enacted a law “banning lawn care pesticide applications
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Keep in mind that these state-adopted measures, aimed at
reducing pesticide exposure by reducing pesticide use, are not
driven by the federal regulatory framework. As Professor Wendy Wagner and Lynn Blais have observed, “[T]he actual environmental application and use of . . . pesticides . . . is not regu312
Rather, while FIFRA
lated at all on the federal level.”
requires registration and compliance with labeling, the regula313
tion on pesticide use is left to the states. Many states have
314
failed to fill that gap. Because of the impacts of pesticide proliferation on the ambient environment, discussed below, this ad
hoc approach is not adequate to address the scope of the problem. As Professor Wagner and Blais have observed, FIFRA’s
regulatory gaps have created a “legal blindspot” that leaves environmental threats to children’s health woefully un315
addressed.
Together these examples highlight that, outside of the food
residue context, FIFRA leaves many potential exposures to pesticides unregulated and unexamined. To be sure, FIFRA does
give the EPA authority to ban or restrict the use of pesticides
that would cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the envi316
ronment.” In fact, FIFRA requires product manufacturers
seeking to register pesticides to show that the new pesticide or
new use meets this safety standard before pesticides are ap317
proved to enter the market. In theory, this burden-shifting
framework sounds good. Indeed, it is adopted by the European
Union’s chemicals legislation—REACH—and has been similar318
ly part of the successful effort to reform TSCA.

on the grounds of day care centers, elementary and middle schools (grade 8
and lower) as a result of residents’ concerns about children’s health and the
environment.” CONN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CONNECTICUT’S LAWN CARE
PESTICIDE BAN: INFORMATION FOR SCHOOLS AND DAY CARE CENTERS, http://
www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/p2/government/turf_mgt_without_pesticides_final_
(2).pdf.
312. Wendy Wagner & Lynn Blais, Children’s Health and Environmental
Exposure Risks: Information Gaps, Scientific Uncertainty, and Regulatory Reform, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 249, 265 (2007).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. 7 U.S.C. §136a(a).
317. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that FIFRA shifts the burden of showing
safety from the EPA to the registrant).
318. Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2016) (amending the registration requirements of TSCA).
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FIFRA’s bite, however, remains weak despite the fact that
it places the burden of showing safety on industry. One reason
is that, like TSCA, a finding of “unreasonable adverse effects”
must consider environmental, social, and economic costs. By
entwining the safety threshold with economic considerations,
this standard puts a thumb on the scale of pesticide proliferation and shifts the focus away from longer-term public and ecological health. In particular, the cost-benefit component makes
substantive regulation of widely used pesticides difficult given
that bans will often carry significant economic costs while so319
cial and environmental benefits will be harder to quantify. In
addition, cost-benefit analysis is only as good as the information available to properly value costs and benefits.
Even if FIFRA’s measure of “unreasonableness” were tied
solely to health risks, the effectiveness of FIFRA’s safety
standard would still be limited by information gaps. Several
scholars have noted the limited toxicity testing available to
evaluate pesticide safety. For example, the EPA has been criticized for failing to “require full-scale neurodevelopmental tox320
icity testing, even for neurotoxic pesticides.” The guidelines
that do exist fail to adequately consider long-term degenerative
effects of pesticide exposure, which is a particular concern for
children. Effects on the immune system and endocrine system
similarly suffer from lack of information and testing. These information gaps are even more pronounced in older pesticides
321
that were on the market before FIFRA was enacted.
One of the culprits for FIFRA’s information gaps is the
322
EPA’s conditional registration authority. Notably, no aggregate risk assessment is required under FQPA for conditional

For a discussion of REACH and a call to reform U.S. law to include similar
burden-shifting requirements, see Sachs, supra note 6, at 1836.
319. For a detailed examination of the history (and ineffectiveness) of
FIFRA in banning pesticides under the current statutory structure, see
FREDERICK ROWE DAVIS, BANNED: A HISTORY OF PESTICIDES AND THE SCIENCE OF TOXICOLOGY (2014). For a discussion of the systemic problems in valuing regulatory benefits, see Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1505 (2010).
320. See Wagner & Blais, supra note 312, at 266.
321. See id.
322. The EPA is allowed to grant conditional registrations for pesticides
that are substantially similar to currently registered pesticides, as well as to
registrations proposing new uses of current pesticides and pesticides with new
active ingredients. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(A) (2012).
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323

registrations. Moreover, FIFRA’s burden-shifting provisions
do not apply to the conditional registration process, which by
its design allows the EPA to register pesticides without full
324
safety data.
Ostensibly, registrants have between one and four years to
325
provide the missing information. Whether this information is
actually submitted within the required timeframe, however, is
a bit of mystery. A 2013 Government Accountability Office
study found major problems with the EPA’s method for track326
ing pesticide registrations. This study was prompted by environmental groups claims that the “EPA had overused conditional registrations” to the point where “conditional
registrations represented the majority of active registra327
tions.” And based on information collected through Freedom
of Information Act requests, the group raised concerns that
some 3200 pesticides had been in conditional status since 1995
328
and 2100 had been in conditional status since 1990. Some of
these claims were confirmed when the EPA’s Office of Pesticide
Programs (OPP) conducted an internal review in 2011 that determined sixty-nine percent of active pesticide registrations
were conditionally registered. Keep in mind that conditional
registrations represent the pesticides that are being sold and
used in the United States without adequate safety data.
The state of conditional registrations is both more complicated and disturbing than the OPP information suggests. When
the GAO followed up on these claims in 2013, the GAO uncovered a deeper problem: “OPP lacks a reliable system specifically
to track the status of conditional registrations to ensure that
additional required data are submitted timely, and that OPP
329
reviews that data.” In other words, OPP was not able to say
how many of its conditional registrations were subsequently
backed by adequate safety data and how many had fallen
through the regulatory cracks. Indeed, OPP reported that each
323. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 735 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding EPA’s decision not to conduct an aggregate risk assessment in granting a conditional registration of clothing and textile pesticides containing
nanosilver).
324. § 136a(c)(7).
325. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EPA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO
IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF CONDITIONAL REGISTRATIONS 3 (2013).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 12.
329. Id. at 19.
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of its twenty product managers used a variety of methods to
track information regarding the status of conditional registrations, “including electronic spreadsheets or reminder notices,
330
handwritten notes, and memory.” With this kind of ad hoc
approach, mistakes and oversights are bound to arise. Not surprisingly, the GAO Report provides some examples that leave
one to question the seriousness with which OPP treats issues of
pesticides and the public health:
For example, in the case of a pesticide product containing the active
ingredient Foramsulfuron, conditionally registered in November
2002, two required studies on the effects of this pesticide on terrestrial and aquatic plants that were due in December 2004 had not been
submitted 10 years after the conditional registration was issued, as
determined by OPP’s registration review of this pesticide in 2012. In
another case, involving a pesticide product containing the active ingredient Acetamiprid, conditionally registered in March 2002, OPP
discovered during its registration review of this pesticide in 2012,
about 10 years later, that it had received, but not reviewed, a study
related to the effects of this pesticide on honeybees. OPP documents
indicate the registrant submitted this study in 2001, even before OPP
granted the conditional registration. Acetamiprid belongs to a class of
pesticides called neonicotinoids that some beekeepers, environmental
331
groups, and others suspect of having adverse effects on honeybees.

The summary lesson is troubling: for almost forty years the
EPA has been bypassing the safety standard under FIFRA
without assurances that information gaps would be closed in
any timely fashion, or at all. Needless to say, the EPA’s widespread use of conditional registrations supports the origins of
FIFRA as a weak regulatory regime concerned mainly with registration and labeling; one not founded on the expectation of
having much teeth in terms of public health protection. Indeed,
the EPA’s approach to conditional registrations is a troubling
example of Professor Donald Hornstein’s observation that “pesticide regulation is not . . . a body of law that addresses in any
strategic way the underlying prevalence of pesticides in American agriculture, nor is it a body of law designed to minimize
332
Conditional registrations also illustrate a
pesticide use.”
deeper pathological problem with FIFRA—ones where the ad
hoc regulatory approach reflects a disregard for the serious
public health issues associated with widespread pesticide use.

330. Id. at 23.
331. Id. at 25.
332. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG.
369, 392 (1993), cited in Wagner & Blais, supra note 312, at 265–66, n.83.
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IV. A PATH FORWARD (AND SOME HURDLES)
While this Article is primarily dedicated to the thesis that
cumulative risk analysis needs to be at the regulatory forefront,
this Part sketches a path forward. In particular, it offers a
home—a legal hook—for cumulative risk in the existing statutory landscape: when assessing whether impacts are “unreasonable” under the applicable safety standards, the EPA should
make cumulative risk part of that assessment. In fact, one
could certainly argue that the EPA must take cumulative risks
into account in order to survive judicial review. Though fairly
straightforward in terms as matter of legal interpretation,
identifying a legal hook is not in itself a solution unless some
underlying equitable concerns are addressed. This Part, therefore, concludes by cataloging the practical policy challenges
that regulators will have to tame in order for cumulative risk
assessments to translate into risk reduction strategies.
A. SAFETY THRESHOLDS AS THE KEYSTONE TO REGULATING
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
The most direct and obvious step toward integrating cumulative risk assessments into the existing regulatory frameworks
would be for the EPA to consider cumulative risks as part of
regulatory safety thresholds. Both FIFRA and the Chemical
Safety Act of 2016 support this approach.
1. “Unreasonable Risk” and the Chemical Safety Act of 2016
Under the Chemical Safety Act of 2016, the EPA has the
authority to regulate chemicals that “present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment, without considera333
tion of costs or other nonrisk factors.” This safety threshold of
“unreasonable risk” is similar to the one that governed under
TSCA and is broad enough to support the consideration of cumulative risk; indeed, the legislative history of TSCA reflects
Congress’s desire to do just that. And in passing the Chemical
Safety Act of 2016, there is no indication that Congress intended to take a narrow view or otherwise exclude the consideration
of cumulative risk. In fact, the Chemical Safety Act includes
several statutory provisions that strengthen the EPA’s authority to restrict chemical use under the new Act.

333. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(3)(A) (2016).
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The most obvious way that Congress strengthened the
safety threshold is the prohibition against considering “cost or
other nonrisk factors” when evaluating safety. By making clear
that the safety threshold is a health-based determination, Congress took an express step toward public health protection and
signaled its desire to approach chemicals regulation as a public
health issue foremost. Because cumulative risk lies at the heart
of public health, it stands to reason that the including cumulative risk in the safety assessment would be consistent with
Congress’s directive to assess risk on the basis of health.
Notably, the Chemical Safety Act does not abandon considerations of the economic consequences of regulations altogether. Once the EPA determines that a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk, the EPA must consider, as part its
rulemaking, the benefits of the chemical substance and the
334
economic consequences of any proposed restrictions. Unlike
TSCA, however, the Chemical Safety Act does not require a
formal cost-benefit analysis nor does it require the EPA to
make decisions based on that analysis. Rather, the Chemical
Safety Act simply directs the EPA to factor economic consequences “to the extent practicable” in the agency’s selection of
335
prohibitions and restrictions. The latitude afforded to the
EPA to prescribe restrictions under the Chemical Safety Act,
and the Act’s deletion of a cost-based decision model, is further
example of Congress’s intent to support health-based determinations under the Act.
In addition, the Chemical Safety Act opens the door for the
EPA to consider cumulative risk in safety determinations in
another critical regard. Namely, in an attempt to fix TSCA,
Congress shifted the burden of proving safety of new chemicals
to industry. Now, like FIFRA and the EU’s REACH legislation,
a manufacturer can only start making and selling a new chemical under the Chemical Safety Act if the EPA has determined
that the new chemical “is not likely to present an unreasonable
336
risk of injury to health or the environment.” Relatedly, the
EPA must impose restrictions necessary to protect the public if
the new chemical presents or may present an unreasonable
risk, if the EPA lacks sufficient information to make a safety
determination, or if the chemical is produced in large amounts

334. Id. § 2605(c)(2)(A).
335. Id. § 2605(c)(2)(B).
336. Id. § 2604(a)(3)(A).
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337

and results in large releases or exposures. By contrast, under
the old TSCA, manufacturers were generally free to start making and distributing a new chemical unless the EPA determined that the chemical posed an unreasonable risk within the
ninety day window.
This burden shift signals a new era of precaution in chemicals regulation and provides the EPA with the opportunity to
be more thorough in its risk evaluations. Consider that under
the old law, the EPA had ninety days to make a safety determination and the EPA had the burden of proving a new chemical was unsafe. Under those circumstances, the EPA might
reasonably have shied away from cumulative risk analysis,
both because of the time and because of the uncertainty. After
all, when the EPA bore the burden of proof, uncertainties
would have undermined the EPA’s ability to regulate. In other
words, when the EPA had the burden of proving that a chemical presented an unreasonable risk, the EPA may very well
have concluded that the dearth of information on issues of cumulative exposure would not permit the EPA to make a determination of “unreasonable risk” on that basis.
Now that the burdens are flipped, the EPA actually has the
opposite problem. Whereas uncertainties historically prevented
the EPA from barring the manufacture of new chemicals, the
EPA cannot reasonably conclude that a new chemical is safe
unless uncertainties are resolved and unless more information
is known about cumulative risks. In fact, because cumulative
risk responds to the actual, real-life risks that chemicals pose,
there is no logical reason why the burdens of proving safety
338
should not reflect that full suite of actual risks.
There are two final aspects of the Chemical Safety Act of
2016 that support the adoption of a cumulative risk perspective
to public health. First, the Act requires the EPA to base its de339
cisions on “the best available science.” As risk science evolves
to provide a fuller suite of tools and methodologies for assessing
cumulative risk, the EPA’s obligation to use that science is
mandated by this “best science” provision.
Second, the Chemical Safety Act requires the EPA to include certain discussions in its risk evaluations. Notably, the

337. Id. § 2604(a)(3)(B).
338. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42 (1983) (setting forth “arbitrary and capricious” factors).
339. 15 U.S.C. § 2625(h) (2016).
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EPA is required to “describe whether aggregate or sentinel exposures to a chemical substance under the conditions of use
340
were considered, and the basis for that consideration.” While
this provision stops short of requiring the EPA to conduct a
cumulative risk assessment, it certainly reflects Congress’s
awareness that issues of aggregate exposure are relevant to
risk evaluations. When read in light of the “best available science” mandate, it creates a structure whereby the EPA will
have to justify any decision to exclude such information.
For all of these reasons, the EPA should systematize its
use of cumulative risk assessment under the Chemical Safety
Act. The timing of such a move is good. The Act requires the
EPA to develop risk evaluation regulations within a year of the
Act’s effective date. While the ossification of rulemaking will
likely extend this timeframe, these are the issues that ought to
be on the EPA’s agenda as it sets those risk evaluation protocols for the future.
2. “Unreasonable Adverse Effects” and FIFRA
Similar to the Chemical Safety Act, the EPA is authorized
under FIFRA to limit the distribution, sale or use of a pesticide
341
“to prevent unreasonable adverse effects to the environment.”
And like the Chemical Safety Act, nothing in the language of
FIFRA suggests that cumulative exposures fall outside the
safety thresholds. FIFRA’s safety standard, in fact, is already
borne out of a conception of the environment as a series of interconnected and interacting parts. In particular, FIFRA’s safety standard turns on the effects to the environment, where environment is broadly defined to mean “water, air, land and all
plants and man and other animals living therein, and the in342
terrelationships that exist among these.”
To the extent that Congress intended to narrow the impact
of FIFRA’s safety threshold, that narrowing was not in the consideration of biological effects. Rather, Congress narrowed the
impact of FIFRA’s regulatory bite by requiring regulatory decisions to balance public health risks with economic and social
benefits of pesticide use. To that end, FIFRA defines “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as “taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and bene-

340. Id. § 2605(b)(4)(F).
341. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2012).
342. Id. § 136( j).
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fits of the use of any pesticide.” It is this balancing that ultimately will limit the usefulness of the cumulative risk analysis.
To be clear, however, the statute does not prevent regulators
from taking full account of the risks. And it stands to reason
that the balancing of risk and benefits cannot properly take
place without a full understanding of the risks in their social
context.
***
Given the breadth of the safety standard under both regulatory frameworks, the unreasonableness of risks should necessarily turn on real-world exposures and public health impacts.
Logic dictates that cumulative risks would be part of that assessment. In fact, given the advancements in risk science and
the frank acknowledgement by regulators that questions of
cumulative risk are highly relevant to public health burdens,
the failure of the EPA to consider cumulative risks, even if on a
qualitative level, could be grounds for legal challenge. In other
words, not considering cumulative risks might reasonably give
rise to a claim that the agency engaged in arbitrary and capricious decision-making for failure to consider all the relevant
344
factors.
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the EPA
failed to consider all relevant factors when it failed to consider
cost in the first step of regulating mercury emissions from pow345
er plants. The Court observed that cost is so obviously a factor in the usual regulatory calculus that it must be considered
when determining whether regulation is “necessary and appro346
priate” under the Clean Air Act. Like cost, assessing cumulative risk is clearly a key ingredient in the understanding of
public health risks from chemicals and pesticide regulation.
And, like the Clean Air Act’s regulatory threshold (“appropriate
and necessary”), the safety thresholds of FIFRA and the Chemical Safety Act invite a broad consideration of risks. It stands to
343. Id. § 136(bb).
344. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42 (1983).
345. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015).
346. Id. (holding that the EPA’s decision to regulate mercury emissions
from power plants without considering cost was arbitrary and capricious because “[n]ot only must an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its
lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational. It follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests on a consideration of the relevant factors” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
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reason, that under the arbitrary and capricious rulemaking
standard, the EPA must systematically consider cumulative
risks when evaluating safety.
B. HURDLES TO REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK
Risk science supports a more central role for cumulative
risk. The statutes contain an obvious regulatory hook. Rational
decision-making demands that all relevant factors be considered. So, why then, hasn’t cumulative risk assumed a more central role in assessing chemicals and pesticide safety? What
makes the policy lag behind the science? I suggest that there
are two major types of hurdles that cause policy to lay behind
science. The first is informational. The second centers on nettlesome questions of equity.
1. Informational Hurdles
Though approaching chemicals regulation through a cumulative risk lens would better serve public health, there is one
significant reason why taking a cumulative risk focus may have
been difficult under TSCA and FIFRA even if the EPA had
wanted to: information gaps. In particular, making a risk finding requires data regarding chemical toxicity and exposure.
347
Data, however, is not so easy to come by. Fewer than 200
of the 61,000 “existing” chemicals grandfathered into the TSCA
inventory have been reviewed by the EPA for human health
348
risks. In 1998, the EPA released a study that revealed shockingly little information was known about High Production Volume (HPV) chemicals, which are those chemicals produced or
imported into the United States in excess of 1,000,000 lbs. per
349
year. In particular, of the 3000 HPV chemicals, there was no
publicly available toxicity information for forty-three percent of
the chemicals, and a full set of basic toxicity data for only seven
350
percent. Since that time, the EPA has been engaged in the
HPV Chemical Challenge and has partnered with the chemical
351
industry to obtain greater information. The results have been
mixed.
347. Wagner, supra note 19.
348. Ekey, supra note 51, at 171–72.
349. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY
STUDY (1988).
350. Id. at 6.
351. See David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 160–61 (2005) (describing the pro-
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For new chemicals, where manufacturers have been required to submit chemical information as part of the registration process, one might anticipate a different situation. In actuality, few manufacturers submitted complete information for
new chemical review. The EPA estimates that only about fif352
teen percent of companies report any health or safety data.
353
Most fail to report test data of any sort. Information gaps for
354
pesticides are similarly disheartening.
One can imagine these information gaps have contributed
to the agency’s reluctance in considering cumulative risk at all.
In fact, during the same year that the Fifth Circuit dealt a hardy blow to TSCA in the Corrosion Pipe Fittings case, the Citizens for Better Environment filed a TSCA case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on an issue
involving cumulative risks. The Center filed a petition requesting that the EPA use its TSCA authority to require coke plants
on the South side of Chicago to test the cumulative and synergistic interactions of eleven different chemicals emitted from
355
the facilities. While the Center argued that the cumulative
impacts presented an unreasonable risk under TSCA, the EPA
denied the petition on the grounds that “the commencement of
cumulative and synergistic testing of the 11 identified substances, as well as of other chemical substances and mixtures—
356
is not scientifically feasible.” Notably, neither the EPA nor
the testifying experts argued that cumulative risks were inappropriate under TSCA’s safety standard; only that the testing
protocols had not advanced to the point where such inquiries
would be useful.
Given that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the EPA’s efforts
on the regulation of asbestos, which had been supported by extensive scientific evidence, one can sympathize with the EPA’s
reluctance to wade into the more scientifically difficult waters
357
With the adoption of the
of cumulative risk assessment.
Chemical Safety Act, however, the EPA has a tremendous op-

gram).
352. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF TSCA 7 (2009).
353. Id.
354. See Wagner & Blais, supra note 312.
355. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Reilly, No. 85-C-8000, 1991 WL 95040, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
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portunity to make progress on understanding cumulative risk.
Because the Chemical Safety Act takes the major step of shifting the burden of proving safety to manufacturers, it allows the
EPA to set the terms of rational risk evaluation and ask manufacturers to fill in the information gaps accordingly. To the extent uncertainties continue to exist within the risk assessments, regulators can use safety factors to account for
358
cumulative impacts. At least in this way the cumulative risk
issues are part of a systematic analysis. By contrast, burying
one’s head in the sand simply shifts the perception of what the
problem really is.
Once the EPA asserts its authority to consider cumulative
risk as part of the safety thresholds under the Chemical Safety
Act and FIFRA, it stands to reason that the informationgenerating authorities afforded by those Acts could be deployed
as tools for filling in some information gaps on cumulative
risks. In this way, the step of regulating cumulative risk
through the safety threshold becomes the regulatory driver
necessary for furthering the understanding of cumulative risk
as well. The regulatory landscapes under which we exist might
finally break free of the endless cycle of avoiding this critical
issue for lack of information.
2. Policy Hurdles
Moving from risk identification to risk reduction, there are
a cadre of nettlesome policy questions that regulators and
scholars will have to wrestle with. In a nutshell, issues of cumulative risk raise a host of very difficult fairness concerns
about which chemicals should be regulated and by how much.
When all the other arguments and explanations have been laid
on the table, these are the ones that cause commitments to cumulative risk to stray.
Consider, for instance, a scenario in which regulators undertake a cumulative risk assessment for endocrine disruptors
and determine that the combined effects on public health are
unreasonable. What then? Which chemicals, and on what basis,
should the regulator seek to reduce that risk? Banning all endocrine disruptors would be untenable. But even if regulators
sought to ban or restrict some of the endocrine disruptors, that
358. See Sargiannis & Hansen, supra note 262, at 5 (“One way to deal with
the general lack of knowledge about interactions in a cumulative risk assessment context is to use an additional uncertainty factor accounting for potential
synergy effects.”).
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determination could be made on the basis of several factors:
which chemical is most toxic, the volume of the chemical in
commerce, the usefulness of the chemical to social life, or the
chemical that was the first to enter the marketplace. Regulators might also give priority to the chemicals that are well studied, even if those studies uncover some risks.
Deciding which approach to take or how to appropriately
weigh the various risk criteria is beyond the scope of this Arti359
cle. For now, consider that similarly daunting problems of allocating responsibility for combined impacts are not new to environmental law. The Comprehensive Environmental
360
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) has
been regulating toxic soup for decades. At times, that law has
required the EPA and courts to allocate clean up liability for
Superfund sites among hundreds of parties for adverse impacts
generated by countless different chemicals. While the Act holds
potentially responsible parties jointly and severally liable,
courts must nonetheless allocate liability among solvent parties. In making that allocation determination, courts look to the
“Gore factors,” which include equitable considerations like the
amount of hazardous waste contributed to the site, the degree
of toxicity of the waste, the degree of care exercised by the various parties, and the degree of cooperation in working with reg361
ulators to prevent harm. Similarly, under the Clean Water
Act’s TMDL program, regulators are tasked with working
backward from an unacceptable ambient water quality, identifying the relevant point and nonpoint sources of water pollution, and developing an equitable distribution of discharge allowances so that the end goal—clean water—is ultimately
362
met. The same approach undergirds the Clean Air Act’s regulation of NAAQS and the EPA’s new Clean Power Plan.
The fact is that environmental problems are collective action issues at heart. Thus, regulating necessarily means sorting
out issues of equitable distribution of cumulative impacts. The
real difference between these other environmental regulatory
359. For a law and economics discussion of how pollution can be distributed
among the population to reduce risk without reducing the total amount of pollution, see Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 1008
(2012).
360. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012).
361. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1493, 1522–23 (1994) (explaining the Gore factors and allocation process).
362. See HOUCK, supra note 3 for a description of TMDLs.
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programs and the ones that have historically been implemented
for chemicals and pesticides is one of commitment, not difficulty. In that sense, the first step to effective chemicals and pesticide regulation may be shedding the notion that issues of cumulative risk in this context are unique or therefore excused from
serious attention.
CONCLUSION
To argue that understanding cumulative risk is necessary
is not is to say that regulating cumulative risk is easy. In fact,
programs in other environmental laws dealing with cumulative
risk have proven difficult to implement. At the same time, these are the issues that drive to the heart of public health protection and cannot be ignored simply because they pose difficult
issues. The EPA acknowledges as much in its Framework:
“[L]imitations in methods or data should not be seen as a convenient reason for completely ignoring or not posing questions
363
for which stakeholders may be seeking answers.”
To that end, even in a world with complete information for
any individual product, managing risk from chemicals exposure
is beyond the control of the individual consumer for two fundamental reasons. First, individuals cannot reasonably be expected to self-assess the aggregate or cumulative risk profiles of
some endless combination of products. Second, we have reached
a point in our industrial economy where the ambient environment poses exposure risk. That is, the manufacture, distribution, use, and release of chemicals from everyday products and
ubiquitously used pesticides have generated ambient risk in
the greater environment. The individual consumer is not able
to opt out of certain risks even with perfect information. Together these reasons make chemicals regulation a public health
issue.
This may seem an intuitive enough point. And in fact there
are entire fields of scientific study and institutions—e.g., the
National Institute of Environmental Health and Safety—
devoted to understanding the health implications of prolific
chemicals and pesticide use. Unfortunately, federal legislation
governing chemicals exposure through consumer products and
pesticide use has failed to support that basic intuition. But it
need not. This Article offers a critical starting point for regulating cumulative risk—it has laid the foundational arguments for
363. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 33.
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why we should. It has also begun to sketch the guiding framework for how we can. That leaves the question of whether we
will.

